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The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and
the Self-Dealing Solution
Evan C. Zoldan*
Abstract
Scholars and courts have struggled to make sense of the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Klein, an intriguing
but enigmatic opinion concerning the limits of Congress’s ability to
interfere with cases pending before the federal courts. Klein is
intriguing because its broad and emphatic language suggests
significant limits on the power of Congress. Klein is enigmatic
because the Court has never again struck down a statute because of
Klein or even made clear what principle animates its result. In fact,
despite reaffirming the existence of a principle based on Klein, the
Court has repeatedly read it narrowly, suggesting that the principle
it embodies has not been adequately articulated. This Article argues
that Klein’s principle is a specific application of a robust
constitutional tradition that restrains governmental self-dealing. A
Klein principle restraining governmental self-dealing explains the
Court’s Klein cases, situates the principle within constitutional
theory and doctrine, and provides much-needed direction to lower
courts wrestling with questions about legislative intrusions into
judicial functions.

* Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. I am grateful
for the generous comments of Norman Spaulding, Evan Caminker, Eric Segall,
Howard Wasserman, and Peter Gerangelos. For their comments on earlier drafts
of this article, my thanks to members of the faculty of the Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law, participants in the Junior Federal Courts Faculty
Workshop, held at Emory Law School, and participants in the Loyola University
Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium. Thanks also to the University of Toledo
College of Law for its support for this project and Joseph Baldwin for research
assistance.

2133

2134

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017)
Table of Contents

I. Introduction .................................................................... 2135
II. The Elusive Klein Rule of Decision Principle ............... 2143
A. The Klein Case ......................................................... 2144
B. Klein’s Promises ....................................................... 2146
C. Klein’s Broken Promises .......................................... 2148
1. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of
Decision? ............................................................. 2150
2. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of
Decision for Particular Cases? .......................... 2151
3. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of
Decision Retroactively?...................................... 2156
4. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision
Based on Political Motives? ............................... 2158
5. May Congress Direct the Court to Rule
in Favor of the Government? ............................. 2163
6. Might Klein Mean Nothing at All? .................... 2167
III. Back into Klein’s Vault .................................................. 2173
A. What is Self-Dealing? .............................................. 2174
1. Self-Dealing in the American
Constitutional Tradition .................................... 2174
2. Who is the “Self” in Self-Dealing? ..................... 2179
B. Klein Disfavors Governmental Self-Dealing .......... 2182
C. Self-Dealing and the Constitution .......................... 2183
1. Contract Clause Doctrine is Driven by a
Principle Against Governmental Self-Dealing. 2184
2. Due Process Doctrine Reflects a Principle
Against Governmental Self-Dealing ................. 2186
3. Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine Reflects a
Principle Against Governmental Self-Dealing . 2188
D. Klein’s Principle Reformulated ............................... 2190
IV. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle ................................... 2194
A. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Explains
Klein Itself ................................................................ 2195
B. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Easily Explains
Most Rule of Decision Cases ................................... 2197
C. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle and the
Limits of Doctrine .................................................... 2201

THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE

2135

1. Robertson and the Changed Law Rule.............. 2201
a. The Northwest Timber Compromise ........... 2202
b. The Broader Governmental
Objective Analysis ........................................ 2203
c. The Changed Law Rule Reconsidered ......... 2206
2. Eslin and Congress’s Grace ............................... 2207
a. The District of Columbia .............................. 2208
b. The Court of Claims ..................................... 2210
c. Eslin in the Court of Claims ........................ 2211
d. Fulfilling an Obligation or an
Act of Grace? ................................................. 2212
V. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Applied to
Future Cases .................................................................. 2216
A. Case A—The Local Power Amendment .................. 2218
B. Case B—The Federal Dam Power
Amendment .............................................................. 2221
C. Case C—The Huron Dam Project
Amendment .............................................................. 2223
VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 2227
I. Introduction
By dividing the power of the federal government among three
interdependent branches,1 the Constitution sets the lawful
exercise of power by each branch in tension with the lawful
exercise of power by the others.2 This Article explores one
prominent and perennial consequence of this tension. On one
hand, Congress is empowered to enact statutes that federal courts
must apply;3 on the other hand, the courts are empowered to decide

1. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (establishing the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of the federal government).
2. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (noting that the
Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring))).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”).
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cases pending before them.4 Usually, these powers are
complementary. When Congress writes broad, generally applicable
statutes, the courts have ample leeway to decide cases pending
before them by applying the law to the facts of these pending
cases.5 Conflict arises when Congress enacts a statute so specific
that it guarantees an outcome in a particular case.6 When it acts
with this level of specificity, Congress’s lawful power to write rules
can be indistinguishable from the courts’ prerogative to decide
cases pending before them.7
The line between lawmaking and judicial application of law is
governed by a facet of separation of powers doctrine called the
Klein “rule of decision” principle.8 The Klein rule of decision
principle is named for a Reconstruction-era Supreme Court case
that rebuffed Congress’s attempt to direct a federal court to rule in
favor of the government in a particular class of cases.9 Klein held,
in deceptively simple language, that Congress may not prescribe a
rule of decision for the federal courts in cases pending before
them.10 The intuitive simplicity of Klein’s rule of decision principle
has earned it a place in the Federal Courts canon. However,
although the Court has entertained numerous Klein challenges in
the 150 years since it was decided, the Court has found no other
Klein violation nor adequately explained the principle that
animates its result. Scholars, too, have continued to wrestle with

4. See id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in . . . inferior Courts.”).
5. See JAMES PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 405 (2016)
(noting that applying rules of decision is precisely what courts do).
6. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953)
(inferring a limitation from Article III on Congress’s ability to “tell the court how
to decide” a case over which it has jurisdiction).
7. William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, The
Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1104–05 (1999) (noting the narrow
space, if any, between writing rules of decision and guaranteeing an outcome).
8. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
9. See id. at 147 (holding that Congress may not “prescribe a rule in
conformity with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction” otherwise
conferred by Congress).
10. Id. at 146.
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the Klein puzzle, although they have never agreed on what Klein
means or even whether it means anything at all.11
The Court’s recent opinion in Bank Markazi v. Peterson12
elucidates how difficult it is to articulate an enforceable Klein rule
of decision principle.13 Bank Markazi arose out of a lawsuit by
victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism to recover damages from
the country of Iran.14 Because Iran had no assets in the United
States that could satisfy these judgments, Congress directed the
federal courts to treat the assets of Bank Markazi, the Central
Bank of Iran, as the assets of the country of Iran for the purposes
of the pending lawsuit.15 The effect of the statute was to direct the
court to find in favor of the claimants, awarding approximately
$1.75 billion dollars to hundreds of terrorism victims.16 The Court
11. See generally PETER A. GERANGELOS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE IN JUDICIAL PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND
LIMITATIONS (2009) [hereinafter GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS]; Evan H.
Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson,
Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2003); Martin H. Redish &
Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the
Democratic Process: Harnessing The Political Theory of United States v. Klein,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006); Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of
When Congress Impermissibly Intrudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate Courts’ Rejection of the
Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1071–72 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s
First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L. J. 2525 (1998); Stephen I.
Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters: Congressional Deception and the War on
Terrorism, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 251 (2011); Howard Wasserman, The
Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (2011); Gordon G. Young,
Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189 (1981) [hereinafter Young,
Congressional Regulation]; Gordon G. Young, United States v. Klein, Then and
Now, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 265 (2012) [hereinafter Young, Klein, Then and Now].
12. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
13. Id. (upholding a statute that favored a party in a pending case).
14. See id. at 1319 (describing underlying conduct that gave rise to claims).
15. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b) (2012) (defining assets subject to execution to
include assets specifically named in a particular lawsuit); see also Bank Markazi,
136 S. Ct. at 1320–21 (describing the operation of Iran Threat Reduction and
Syria Human Rights Act).
16. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320–22 (noting that the district court
ordered the turnover of Bank Markazi’s assets to satisfy outstanding judgments
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wrestled with the fact that the statute left little, if any, judicial
work for the court to do, but ultimately upheld it.17 Bank Markazi
suggests that any limitation on Congress’s ability to pick winners
and losers in particular, pending cases is slim.18
This Article reexamines Klein in order to determine what
principle it states, if, indeed, it states any principle at all. A close
look at Klein, its progeny, and related Supreme Court doctrine,
reveals that Klein still polices the boundary between lawmaking
and law application by preventing governmental self-dealing. That
is, although Congress has broad leeway to direct the courts to write
rules of decision for courts to follow, Congress does not have
unlimited power to direct courts to render judgment in favor of the
government in particular cases. A principle against governmental
self-dealing not only explains Klein and other rule of decision
cases, but it also situates Klein within a strong constitutional
tradition that restrains the government from acting in its own
self-interest without also providing generally applicable rules of
conduct.19
Part II of this Article describes Klein’s mysterious rule of
decision principle and the meanings most often attributed it.20
Klein has long stood for the proposition that Congress may not
make an exception to federal court jurisdiction when the
withdrawal “is founded solely on the application of a rule of
decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”21 This
statement seems, at first blush, correct because it resonates with
abstract notions of separation of powers: a constitutional norm
preventing Congress from prescribing a rule of decision in a
particular case appears to insulate the judicial function from
legislative interference. In his foundational essay about Congress’s
power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Henry Hart
against Iran).
17. See id. at 1329 (holding that the relevant statute does not offend
separation of powers because it does not impinge upon the independence of the
judiciary).
18. See id. at 1326 (upholding statute that directs judgment in favor of
particular party in pending case).
19. See infra Part III (introducing a principle against governmental selfdealing).
20. See infra Part II (discussing Klein).
21. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).

THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE

2139

read Klein as establishing the principle that Article III of the
Constitution creates a space for federal courts not just to declare
one party to a case the winner, but actually, acting like a court, to
decide the case.22
Hart did not articulate what principle would constrain
Congress’s otherwise broad power to set federal court jurisdiction;
in the subsequent half-century, scholars have tried to answer this
question by proposing principles that comport with the language
and result of Klein itself and also explain the Court’s reluctance to
find a Klein violation in any subsequent case.23 The most
persuasive explanations of Klein’s rule of decision principle argue
that the result turned on the specificity or retroactivity of the
statute at issue in Klein,24 the fact that it seemed to be politically
motivated,25 or the fact that it directed a decision in favor of the
government.26 Despite the merits of these explanations, however,
each fails to state an enforceable principle because each conflicts
with longstanding doctrine and jurisprudential considerations.
Recognizing the difficulty in finding a jurisprudentially coherent,
doctrinally supported Klein principle, a number of scholars have
given up looking for one, instead contending that, however
important the sentiment animating Klein,27 the case states no
enforceable and coherent principle about the line between the
judiciary and the legislature.28
22. See Hart, supra note 6, at 1373 (inferring a limitation from Article III on
Congress’s ability to “tell the court how to decide” a case over which it has
jurisdiction).
23. E.g., Sager, supra note 11, at 2528–29 (formulating principle based on
Klein).
24. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 177–79 (raising
concerns about targeted legislation); Jackson, supra note 11, at 586–87 (same).
25. See Sager, supra note 11, at 2528–29 (describing a Klein principle that
prohibits Congress from forcing the judiciary to “speak and act against its own
best judgment”); Young, Klein, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 269 (arguing that
Congress may not open the federal courts “only to use them as puppets”).
26. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 181–83 (raising
concern with legislation that favors the government as a party); Ronner, supra
note 11, at 1071 (same); Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1244
(same).
27. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that Klein stands for
important if unenforceable principles).
28. See Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal)
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But, even this explanation is unsatisfying. Unlike many cases
that the Court has explicitly or implicitly overruled, the Court
continues to reaffirm the importance of Klein. In its recent Bank
Markazi case, the Court reaffirmed Klein’s rule of decision
language and appeared to try to make sense of Klein in light of
prior and subsequent authority.29 Because the Court continues to
treat Klein as stating an important constitutional principle, this
Article seeks a viable principle that can explain Klein, square it
with the significant doctrine that stands in tension with it, and
situate it within the American constitutional tradition.30
Part III returns to Klein to determine whether it is possible to
articulate a rule of decision principle that meets the concerns
raised in Part II.31 Closely analyzing the language of Klein reveals
that the Court was troubled that Congress directed a result in
favor of the government. But, as others have noted, a principle that
prevents Congress from ever favoring the government in a pending
case is too broad to accurately state the law.32 Nevertheless, Klein
can be read, accurately and meaningfully, to embody a principle
against governmental self-dealing.
Governmental self-dealing is a phenomenon disfavored in
constitutional law and jurisprudence. The generation that framed
the Constitution, steeped in the republican tradition,33 developed
Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 423–24 (2000) (arguing that “the Court has
labored to identify some extra test, restriction, or factor that can coherently
separate Klein violations from ordinary legislation” but “none of these efforts has
succeeded”); Wasserman, supra note 11, at 85 (asserting that “Klein does no more
than Marbury and dozens of cases in which the Court has struck down
substantive federal statutory law as violating individual constitutional rights”).
At least, Klein is still good law for its alternative holding about the line between
congressional authority and the President’s pardon power. See Witkowski v.
United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 393, 396–97 (1872) (reaffirming Klein’s application to the
line between the executive and legislative branches).
29. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323–26 (2016)
(reaffirming the validity of the Klein rule of decision principle).
30. See infra Part III (introducing a Klein principle against governmental
self-dealing).
31 Id.
32. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (reading Klein to permit
Congress to enact “generally applicable rules of decision, even for pending cases
in which the federal government is a party, which have the effect of deciding the
case in the government’s favor”).
33. See NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
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a strong aversion to self-dealing—that is—the act of trading on a
public prerogative for private gain.34 Although members of the
framing generation did not always act selflessly,35 a dominant
strain of thought during the framing period held “official
disinterestedness” in high regard.36 Prominent and ordinary
members of this generation openly criticized public officials for
benefitting from their official decisions37 and, very often,
scrupulously avoided conflicts of interest when acting in a public
capacity.38 Echoing a longstanding tradition, James Madison
argued that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity.”39 From this premise, Madison
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 10 (2013) (describing the
“civic republican” tradition); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 39 (2014) [hereinafter
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA] (connecting republicanism with a principle
against public corruption); Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 31, 49–50 (2017) (describing the American tradition of
republicanism); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 341, 373–74 (2009) [hereinafter Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle]
(arguing that the Constitution’s framers shared a general belief that political
corruption includes the “self-serving use of public power for private ends”).
34. See KEN KERNAGHAN & JOHN LANGFORD, THE RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC
SERVANT 142–43 (1990) (describing the use of public authority for private gain).
35. See KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE IDEA
AND LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 214 (1991) (noting President George
Washington’s possible self-interest in selecting D.C.’s location); PARILLO, supra
note 33, at 29, 42 (describing colonial and post-revolutionary American legal
structures that permitted self-interested official behavior); Seth Barrett Tillman,
Business Transactions and President Trump’s Emoluments Problem, 40 HARV.
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 759, 764–66 (2017) (explaining President George Washington’s
“engage[ment] in business transactions for value with the Federal Government”).
36. PARILLO, supra note 33, at 10.
37. See BOWLING, supra note 35, at 213 (noting criticism of Washington for
self-interested behavior); Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33,
at 373 (discussing distinction between self-interest and public interest).
38. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL, DEFINER OF A NATION 429
(1996) (describing John Marshall’s avoidance of appearance of conflicts of
interest); GORDON WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE
FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 16–20 (2006) [hereinafter WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY
CHARACTERS] (describing disinterestedness in 18th Century America).
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 124 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
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reasoned that the proposed Constitution’s system of representative
government can mitigate the effects of self-interested
decision-making.40 A principle against self-dealing, not
surprisingly, is reflected in a number of the Constitution’s clauses.
For example, the Constitution precludes the Vice President from
presiding over Senate proceedings to convict the President after
impeachment because the Vice President would benefit personally
and directly from official decisions that led to the President’s
conviction and removal.41
Examining Supreme Court doctrine other than Klein confirms
that minimizing governmental self-dealing is a central concern of
constitutional law. A close reading of well-established doctrine
under the Due Process,42 Contract,43 and Ex Post Facto44 Clauses
demonstrates that a principle against governmental self-dealing
animates the Court’s interpretation of these clauses, all of which
help define the relationship between the government and the
individual. As a result, reading Klein to state a principle against
self-dealing situates the rule of decision principle within a broader
tradition that prevents the government from aggrandizing its
authority through self-interested behavior at the expense of
individual citizens.
Principles gleaned from the Court’s self-dealing doctrine can
be arranged into an administrable test that not only largely
40. See id at 124–25.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that when “the President of
the United States is tried [by the Senate], the Chief Justice shall preside”); Akhil
Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 121–22 (1995) (reading the Constitution’s
clause requiring the Chief Justice to preside over Senate trials of the President
as a device to curb self-dealing); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (delaying
congressional pay raises until after an intervening election).
42. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996)
(distinguishing between “regulatory legislation that is relatively free of
Government self-interest . . . and, on the other hand, statutes tainted by a
governmental object of self-relief”).
43. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (holding
that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and
necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake”).
44. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532–33 (2000) (holding that the Ex
Post Facto Clause prevents the government from retroactively altering rules “in
a way that is advantageous only to the State”).
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explains existing rule of decision doctrine but also provides
direction to courts resolving future cases. Stated succinctly, a Klein
principle against governmental self-dealing prevents a court from
applying a change in law that has the effect of benefitting the
government as a party in a case that is pending.45 A statute
benefits the government as a party if it has the effect of abrogating
an obligation owed by the government46 in a way that is not merely
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective.47
Part IV applies the test formulated above to Klein and the
other rule of decision cases, demonstrating the ability of the Klein
self-dealing principle to explain current doctrine.48 Part V unpacks
the most important implications of the new rule by applying it to a
series of hypothetical cases.49 By analyzing these hypothetical
cases, the advantages of a Klein principle against self-dealing are
revealed: it better explains the law than other theoretical models;
it situates Klein within a robust constitutional tradition
disfavoring governmental self-dealing; it provides clear guidance
to lower courts facing rule of decision cases; and it explains why
the Court has continued to reaffirm Klein’s importance despite its
inability to articulate a workable principle.
II. The Elusive Klein Rule of Decision Principle
The search for an enforceable Klein rule of decision principle
can feel quixotic. Like Don Quixote, the seeker of this principle
must be idealistic enough to look for coherence among Supreme
Court cases whose results are more easily explained by politics
45. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (declining
to apply change in law to favor the government); Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98
(same); United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (same); Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935) (same).
46. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (declining to defer to state’s
repudiation of its own financial obligation).
47. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (distinguishing between self-interested
laws and statutes “incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective”).
48. See infra Part IV (describing a Klein self-dealing principle).
49. See infra Part V (applying Klein to hypothetical cases).
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than law. The prize is the ability to articulate an enforceable
principle that elegantly separates Congress’s power to write rules
of decision from the federal courts’ power to decide cases pending
before them. But just as Quixote tilted at windmills, the federal
courts knight-errant is faced with explanations for Klein that
appear formidable until they are subjected to close examination.
This Part describes the Klein case and its elusive rule of decision
principle. It then explores each of the meanings most often
attributed to Klein and demonstrates the limitations of each as an
enforceable constitutional principle.
A. The Klein Case
The enigmatic Klein rule of decision principle grew out of an
interpretation of the 1863 Abandoned and Captured Property Act
(ACPA), which permitted federal agents to seize and sell
abandoned or captured civilian property in states or territories in
rebellion against the United States.50 Because some of the property
would belong to loyal residents of rebellious areas, the ACPA
permitted claimants to make claims against the United States for
the value of seized property, provided that they demonstrated that
they had “never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.”51
Despite the more obvious interpretation of this language, the
Supreme Court held in a case called United States v. Padelford52
that even a person who had committed disloyal acts would be
considered to have “never given any aid or comfort to the present
rebellion” as long as he later took an oath of loyalty pursuant to a
presidential pardon.53 In facts similar to those in Padelford,
Wilson, a wealthy merchant, took an oath of loyalty after his cotton
was confiscated and sold by Union forces.54 After Wilson’s death,
Klein, the administrator of his estate, prevailed in a suit under the
50. Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820.
51. Id. § 3.
52. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
53. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
54. See Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s
Authority to Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS
STORIES 87, 91–92, 103 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (discussing
the historical background of Padelford).
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ACPA before the Court of Claims.55 The idea of formerly rebellious
southerners taking advantage of a loyalty oath to recover money
from the Treasury exercised the Radical Republicans in
Congress,56 many of whom did not share Lincoln’s hope that
post-war politics would proceed “with malice toward none” and
“charity toward all.”57 While Klein’s case was pending on the
government’s appeal from the award, Congress tried to undo
Padelford by eliminating pending and future claims under the
ACPA for claimants who relied on an oath of loyalty.58
In what would otherwise have been a routine appropriations
bill funding the federal government for the coming year, Congress
added a proviso that would become the focal point of the Supreme
Court’s Klein decision.59 After appropriating money to pay
judgments rendered against the United States, the bill provided
that no loyalty oath would be admissible as evidence to support any
claim against the United States under the ACPA,60 as it had been
used in Padelford and Klein’s action before the Court of Claims.61
Instead, a presidential pardon would serve as “conclusive evidence
that [a claimant] did take part in and give aid and comfort to the
late rebellion” within the meaning of the ACPA.62 The proviso
further directed the Court of Claims to dismiss suits in which the
claimant asserted an oath of loyalty as proof of claim and withdrew
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court over claims—like Klein’s—in
which the claimant had previously prevailed based on a loyalty
oath.63
55. Id. at 93.
56. Id. at 94–95 (arguing that the proviso was prompted by the Radical
Republican desire to undo Padelford).
57. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865).
58. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143–44 (1871) (noting
that the proviso made “no pardon . . . admissible in evidence” to support a claim
for reparations).
59. Tyler, supra note 54, at 94–95. The appropriations proviso is also known
as the Drake Amendment, after its sponsor, United States Senator from Missouri,
Charles Drake. Id.
60. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 1, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
61. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 533 (1869); Klein,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133–34.
62. Act of July 12, 1870 § 1.
63. Id.
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B. Klein’s Promises

When the government’s appeal from the Court of Claims’s
judgment for Klein reached the Supreme Court, the Court
invalidated the appropriations proviso and held that Klein was
entitled to his judgment.64 This much is clear. But, what is less
clear is the basis for the result. Neither in Klein itself, nor in
subsequent cases, has the Court adequately explained precisely
what principle animates the holding.65 In his opinion for the Court,
Chief Justice Chase introduced a number of interrelated concepts
that have formed the basis for all subsequent discussions about
Klein’s meaning.66 In order to understand Klein’s possible
meanings, it is first helpful to examine Chase’s language.
Chase began by finding that Wilson (Klein’s decedent) had
been pardoned pursuant to presidential proclamation and
statutory acts of amnesty.67 As a result, under the pre-proviso
ACPA, as interpreted in Padelford, Klein would be entitled to the
proceeds of the seized cotton.68 The issue, then, was the effect of
the appropriations proviso.69 Because the proviso purported to
withdraw the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the Supreme
Court, Chase addressed whether Congress has power to do so
under its authority to manage the inferior courts of the United
States and its power to make exceptions from the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.70 Chase acknowledged that “the legislature
has complete control over the organization and existence” of the
Court of Claims and the absolute right to eliminate the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over “a particular class of cases.”71
But, Chase noted, “the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend
64. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148.
65. See Tyler, supra note 54, at 87; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 437;
Vermeule, supra note 28, at 423–24; Vladeck, supra note 11, at 251; Wasserman,
supra note 11, at 54–55.
66. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 54, at 101–13; Redish & Pudelski, supra note
11, at 437; Vermeule, supra note 28, at 423–24; Vladeck, supra note 11, at 251;
Wasserman, supra note 11, at 54–55.
67. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 140–43 (1871).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 142.
70. Id. at 143.
71. Id. at 145.
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to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end,”
that is, to deny the effect of presidential pardons.72 Because the
purpose of the proviso was to “deny to pardons granted by the
President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have,”
Chase concluded that the proviso’s withdrawal of jurisdiction was
“founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes
pending, prescribed by Congress.”73
It is these words, Klein’s rule of decision principle, which have
intrigued and confounded generations of scholars.
The cause of this confusion is clear: where one would expect
an explanation of what is wrong with a statute that withdraws
jurisdiction based on a “rule of decision, in causes pending,
prescribed by Congress,”74 Chase offered scarcely more than a
repetition of the rule of decision language. Chase wrote that the
proviso was not an exercise of Congress’s Exceptions Clause power
because it required the Court to “ascertain the existence of certain
facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has
ceased . . . . What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of
a cause in a particular way?”75 Chase then made the same point a
third time: “We are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that
the judgment must be affirmed, because of a pardon . . . . Can we
do so without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases
pending before it? We think not . . . .”76 Chase concluded that this
behavior—prescribing a rule of decision in causes pending—
“passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial
power.”77
Chase made two other points that are relevant for determining
the scope of Klein. First, Chase intimated that the proviso was
defective because it intervened in a suit in favor of the United
States against a private party.78 Specifically, Chase was bothered
by the fact that the proviso purported to allow “one party to the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 145–46.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 146.
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controversy to decide it in its own favor.”79 And, later, Chase
returned to this theme, denouncing the proviso because it
withdrew the Court’s jurisdiction “because and only because its
decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the
government and favorable to the suitor.”80 Second, Chase held, in
the alternative, that the statute violated the principle of
separation of powers because it purported to change the effect of
the President’s amnesty proclamation.81 The legislature “cannot
change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can
change a law.”82 The proviso, then, impaired not only the judicial
power by prescribing a rule of decision in causes pending; it also
“impair[ed] the executive authority and direct[ed] the court to be
instrumental to that end.”83
Chase’s short opinion ended with a statement that, with
hindsight, seems imbued with irony: “We think it unnecessary to
enlarge. The simplest statement is the best.”84 But, Chase’s opinion
has proved far from simple to disentangle. It has generated reams
of scholarship attempting to discern what Klein meant in its own
time and what it might mean today.85 Many of these readings
contain useful insights but none have proved wholly satisfying.
The following section analyzes each of the most likely readings of
Klein and determines whether any can serve as the basis for an
independent, enforceable rule of decision principle.
C. Klein’s Broken Promises
Klein’s rule of decision principle, that it is unconstitutional for
Congress to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts based
“solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending,
79. Id.
80. Id. at 147.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 148.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. L. J. 2547, 2549 (1998) [hereinafter Meltzer, Constitutional
Remedies]; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 437; Wasserman, supra note 11,
at 65.
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prescribed by Congress,”86 seems at once intuitively correct and too
broad to be literally true.87 The rule of decision language resonates
with abstract notions of separation of powers; preventing Congress
from prescribing a rule of decision in a particular case appears to
preserve an important part of the judicial function from legislative
interference. However, a literal reading of this prohibition conflicts
with precedent requiring courts to apply the law as Congress
writes it, even on appeal from final judgment in pending cases, and
even retroactively.88 Scholars and courts have tried to resolve this
tension by offering a variety of interpretations of Klein’s rule of
decision principle.89 Some of these readings attempt to articulate a
Klein rule of decision principle that is viable in light of previous
and subsequent precedent.90 Other readings conclude that Klein
serves as a reminder of important, if unenforceable constitutional
values.91 Still other readings of Klein conclude that its rule of
decision language is meaningless and should be ignored.92 The rest
of this Part considers the most likely explanations of Klein’s rule
of decision language, including the possibility that Klein states no
principle about the line separating the legislative and judicial
functions that can be enforced consistent with doctrine.93

86. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1871).
87. See Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2549 (arguing
that Klein’s principle resonates as important but lacks doctrinal force); Redish &
Pudelski, supra note 11, at 446 (same); Wasserman, supra note 11, at 65 (same).
88. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)
(holding that when “subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the
appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs,
the [new] law must be obeyed”).
89. See supra note 11 (collecting sources describing Klein).
90. See, e.g., Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1244
(arguing that Klein represents an extension of a principle against nonjudicial
revision of court judgments).
91. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that Klein stands for
important if unenforceable principles).
92. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 28, at 380–81 (arguing that Klein states
no coherent and enforceable principle about the line between the judiciary and
the legislature).
93. See infra Part II.C.
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1. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision?

The Klein Court objected to the fact that Congress prescribed
a rule of decision to the courts in causes pending before them.94 The
relevance of the fact that the appropriations proviso affected
pending cases is addressed below.95 But, putting aside the
important issue of specificity for a moment, the Court’s concern in
Klein cannot be that Congress prescribed a rule of decision for the
courts to follow. As a number of scholars have recognized, writing
rules of decision for courts to follow—that is, writing the
substantive law—is precisely what a legislature does.96
Even the more limited claim, that a legislature may not
prescribe how a court finds facts to apply to a rule of decision,
proves too much.97 Congress can, and does, write rules of evidence,
defining what is relevant, what is admissible and inadmissible,
and who is competent to give testimony.98 A notable exception
proves the rule: the Constitution specifically provides a definition
of treason, sets out its required elements, and establishes the mode
of proof required to establish its elements.99 In the absence of the
rare constitutional restriction on its power, Congress is free to
create a claim, delineate its elements, and establish how it may be
proved; in short, Congress may prescribe rules of decision for
courts to follow. As a result, Klein cannot stand for the unadorned
proposition that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision to a
federal court.
94. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (invalidating
the proviso for prescribing a rule of decision in causes pending).
95. See infra Part II.C.2.
96. See PFANDER, supra note 5, at 405 (noting that applying rules of decision
is precisely what courts do); Tyler, supra note 54, at 105 (same); Wasserman,
supra note 11, at 65 (same).
97. Vermeule, supra note 28, at 380–81 (arguing that all statutes make some
facts relevant or irrelevant to adjudication).
98. See generally FED. R. EVID. State legislatures, too, write substantive,
evidentiary, and procedural rules. See generally VA. R. EVID.; VA CODE. ANN.
§ 8.01 (West 2011).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort . . . . No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.”).
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2. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision for
Particular Cases?
Of course, the Klein Court did not invalidate the proviso
simply because it prescribed a rule of decision. Instead, Klein held
that Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial
Department of the government in cases pending before it.”100 This
language suggests that the Court disapproved of the proviso’s
application only to a particular set of cases that were identifiable
because they were already pending before the courts. The Court
made its concern about the particularity of the appropriations
proviso explicit when it described Congress’s more general power
under the Exceptions Clause.101 Congress’s broad power to
withdraw jurisdiction from the Court may lawfully be exercised
only on “a particular class of cases.”102 By contrast, the proviso
applied to particular cases, identifiable because they were pending
before the federal courts, rather than a class of cases.
It is the application of a rule of decision to pending cases
rather than a class of cases that Court describes as “arbitrary” and
explains the distinction Chase drew between Klein’s facts and
those of its earlier case, State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co.103 The Court had previously enjoined the
operation of a bridge that interfered with shipping after finding
that it was a nuisance.104 Congress then enacted a statute
declaring that the bridge was not a nuisance.105 In Wheeling
100. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (emphasis added).
101. See id. at 147 (“The Constitution . . . provides that in all cases other than
those of original jurisdiction, ‘the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Congress shall make.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2)).
102. Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
103. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855); see Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47
(distinguishing the proviso from the statute at issue in Wheeling Bridge). The
Court made this point explicitly in United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371,
430 (1980) (“While Congress enjoys broad authority to regulate judicial
proceedings in the context of a class of cases, when Congress regulates functions
of the judiciary in a pending case, it walks the line between judicial and legislative
authority.” (internal citation omitted)).
104. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 440 (describing the history
leading up to the statute declaring the bridge lawful).
105. Id. at 422.
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Bridge, the Court held that courts must apply new law enacted
during an ongoing litigation that changes the legal significance of
a fact relevant to the litigation.106 Because the injunction was
dependent on the finding that the bridge was a nuisance,
Congress’s declaration that the bridge was not a nuisance changed
the legal significance of the bridge’s interference with shipping and
justified the dissolution of the injunction.107 In Klein, Chase
distinguished this case in the following way: the Wheeling Bridge
Court dissolved the injunction based on the generally applicable
law of nuisance; that is, once the bridge was no longer a nuisance,
the injunction was no longer justified.108 This was lawful, Chase
explained, because the Court “was left to apply its ordinary rules
to the new circumstances created” by the new statute.109 As a
result, no “arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in that case.”110
By contrast, wrote Chase, the Klein appropriations proviso did not
create “new circumstances” but rather required the Court to make
an exception from the standing laws for particular “cases pending
before it.”111 In other words, the appropriations proviso was
arbitrary because it made an exception from the generally
applicable law—the recovery provision of the ACPA—for an
identifiable set of cases, and no others.
The Court’s uneasiness about legislative particularity
comports with basic rule of law principles; if Congress may
prescribe a new rule for a case that is currently before the courts—
and only for that case—it can subject one known individual to
treatment that is different than the treatment of others for
identical conduct. As I have argued elsewhere, a rule that prohibits
legislation from targeting identifiable individuals—a value of
legislative generality—is a principle of constitutional dimension.112
106. Id. at 431.
107. Id. at 431–32.
108. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871).
109. Id. at 147.
110. Id. at 146.
111. Id. at 146–47.
112. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ.
L. REV. 625 (2014) [hereinafter Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality]; Evan C.
Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality, 51 RICH. L.
REV. 489 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component].
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This value comports with constitutional history, the Constitution’s
text, and widely held jurisprudential commitments.113 Indeed, a
value of legislative generality seems to follow directly from Chief
Justice Marshall’s statement in Fletcher v. Peck,114 that “[i]t is the
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for
the government of society; the application of those rules to
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other
departments.”115 The Court was even more explicit in Hurtado v.
California,116 in which it explained that “a special rule for a
particular person or a particular case” cannot properly be
considered “law.”117 In that case, the Court opined that all types of
targeted legislation are invalid, including: “acts of confiscation,
acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man’s
estate to another.”118 Because of the injustice of particularized
legislation, and because of Klein’s focus on pending cases, the most
persuasive explanations of Klein focus on the connection between
legislative direction of the result in pending cases and a value that
disfavors legislative particularity.119 For example, Vicki Jackson
argued that Klein might prohibit Congress from telling a court how
to decide a particular case, even if that prohibition can be evaded
by artful drafting.120 Peter Gerangelos formulated a Klein principle
that accords legislative specificity important, but nonconclusive,
weight.121
113. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 112, at 650–60
(describing the constitutional tradition suggesting an enforceable value of
legislative generality).
114. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
115. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
116. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
117. Id. at 535–36.
118. Id. at 536.
119. See generally Araiza, supra note 7, at 1104–05; Peter A. Gerangelos, The
Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference in Pending Cases, 30 SYDNEY L.
REV. 61, 82 (2008) [hereinafter Gerangelos, Pending Cases]; Jackson, supra note
11, at 583–84. For an argument that legislative generality was already defunct
after Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), see Wasserman,
supra note 11, at 67–69.
120. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 586–87 (noting that the legislature can
control judicial interpretations through narrow drafting).
121. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 177–79
(formulating principles to govern legislative direction of judgments).
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The modern Supreme Court has been less receptive to the idea
of a value of legislative generality. The Court’s recent Bank
Markazi decision, in particular, seriously calls into question
whether legislation is ever constitutionally suspect simply because
it is particularized.122 Bank Markazi grew out of Congress’s
expansion of an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) that allows for suits against state sponsors of terrorism.123
Victims of terrorism, and family members and estate
representatives of those victims, demonstrated that the country of
Iran was responsible for injuries and deaths caused by terrorist
acts.124 Judgments in their favor, which amounted to billions of
dollars, could not be satisfied by assets in the United States.125
With their judgments unsatisfied, these claimants filed a
consolidated action against Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of
Iran.126 Under generally applicable law, however, Bank Markazi,
as a Central Bank, was specifically excluded from the definition of
“state sponsor of terrorism” in the FSIA127 and so could not be
reached to satisfy the existing default judgments against Iran.128
To avoid this result, Congress enacted the Iran Threat Reduction
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which permitted claims
against Iran under the FSIA to be satisfied by the assets of Bank
Markazi.129 Specifically, Congress provided that the “financial
assets that are identified in . . . Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518” would be available “to satisfy
122. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 (2012) (“While
legislatures usually act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means
their only legitimate mode of action.” (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995))).
123. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012)
(providing terrorism exception to sovereign immunity of foreign states); Bank
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319–20 (explaining the operation of the FSIA).
124. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1315.
125. Id. at 1319–20, 1319 n.5, 1320 n.6.
126. Id. at 1315.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
128. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
129. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772 (creating an exception from the general operation of the FSIA); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1611(b)(1) (2012) (providing that funds belonging to a state’s central bank are
immune from attachment).
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any judgment . . . awarded against Iran for damages for personal
injury or death caused by” acts of terrorism.130 The Iran Threat
Reduction statute applied to the particular, pending case against
Bank Markazi and no others.
Before the Supreme Court, Bank Markazi argued that the
Iran Threat Reduction statute violated Klein’s rule of decision
principle because it prescribed a rule that applied to a single
pending case, indeed, one identified in the statute itself.131 The
Court rejected the Bank’s position that there is something wrong
with particularized legislative action.132 The Court noted that “the
assumption that legislation must be generally applicable,” is
“flawed.”133 The Court continued: although “legislatures usually
act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their
only legitimate mode of action.”134 Citing examples of
particularized laws that have been held constitutional (but silent
on Fletcher, Hurtado, and related doctrine), the Court held that
“singling out” an individual is not enough to render a statute
invalid.135
Bank Markazi’s affirmative rejection of a principle disfavoring
particularized legislative action was an innovation. Although the
modern Court has not rigorously enforced a value of legislative
generality,136 previous decisions reserved judgment on whether
targeted legislation could ever be constitutionally defective in the
context of Klein’s rule of decision principle.137 In Robertson v.
Seattle Audubon Society,138 the Court reserved for another day the
possibility that a change in law would be considered
“unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little
more broadly, than the range of applications at issue” in
130. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1), (b) (emphasis added).
131. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2012).
132. Id. at 1327.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (holding that
Congress may legislate for one person if that person is a legitimate class of one).
137. See infra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (considering, but not
deciding, whether particularized legislation can ever be constitutionally infirm).
138. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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specifically named cases.139 When another day came, in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm Inc.,140 the Court again avoided deciding the
issue of specificity.141 In Plaut, the Court invalidated legislation
reopening final judgments; but, the Court did not rest on the fact
that the statute reopened specific cases, instead noting only in
passing that it was “questionable” whether there was something
wrong with particularized legislative action.142 By contrast, Bank
Markazi’s rejection of a value that disfavors particularized
legislation appears more or less definitive.143 The Court’s rejection
of a principle of legislative generality is a misstep that it may need
to retract on further reflection: it does not give appropriate weight
to a constitutional principle of legislative generality suggested by
the
Constitution’s
text,
history,
and
philosophical
144
underpinnings.
Nevertheless, whatever were the reasons
underlying Klein at the time, if Klein stands for an enforceable
principle today, it must be narrower than a prohibition on all
particularized legislation.
3. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision Retroactively?
Closely related to the issue of specificity is the issue of
retroactivity. By providing a rule of decision for cases already
pending at the time of its enactment, Klein’s appropriations
proviso required retroactive application of its new evidentiary
standard.145 Retroactively applied legislation has long been
139. Id. at 441.
140. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
141. See id. (deciding case on grounds other than specificity of statute).
142. Id. at 239. Moreover, Plaut invalidated rather than upheld the statute at
issue in that case. See id. at 218 (invalidating statute on grounds other than
Klein).
143. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 (2012) (holding that
“the assumption that legislation must be generally applicable,” is “flawed”).
144. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of
Legislative Generality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1 (2016) [hereinafter
Zoldan, Bank Markazi].
145. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (noting that
the purpose of the proviso was to deny “pardons granted by the President the
effect which this court had adjudged them to have”); see also PFANDER, supra note
5, at 404, 405 (noting “an element of retroactivity” in the proviso).
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criticized because it can be used to subject a person to conduct he
could not have known was wrong, thereby denying him the
opportunity to conform his conduct to the law.146 Consider Wilson,
Klein’s decedent: he could not have known that taking an oath of
loyalty would, in the future, preclude a suit for damages before the
Court of Claims for his confiscated cotton. Had Wilson known
about this future statute, he might well have chosen to forego the
oath with an eye toward attempting to prove his claim some other
way. Because retrospective laws fail to provide notice of what
conduct is considered lawful, they have been called “oppressive,
unjust, and tyrannical” and “condemned by the universal sentence
of civilized man.”147
However good are the jurisprudential reasons for prohibiting
the retrospective application of statutes, the Supreme Court has
long permitted retroactive laws like Klein’s appropriations
proviso.148 Generally, courts apply a change in law to cases pending
at the time of the change.149 This has long been true, despite the
fact that a person affected by a new law applied in a pending case
has no opportunity to conform her conduct to the law before it is
applied.150 Even outside the context of pending cases, moreover,
restrictions on retroactivity are narrow. The Constitution’s
prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to criminal or penal
laws.151 By contrast, courts will apply civil, nonpunitive laws
146. See Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693, 715, 723 (1960) (arguing
that retroactive legislation denies a person the ability to conform conduct to the
requirements of the law); Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015
WISC. L. REV. 727, 729 (2015) (same).
147. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 216, 266 (1827); see also
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (1969) (“Taken by itself, . . . a retroactive
law is truly a monstrosity.”).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110
(1801).
149. See id. (holding that when “subsequent to the judgment and before the
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule
which governs, the [new] law must be obeyed”).
150. See John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court
Doctrine “As Applied,” 61 N.C. L. REV. 745, 752–53, 756–58, 773 (1983) (discussing
the retroactive effect of applying laws to pending cases).
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798)
(opining that Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal laws); see also John
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retroactively, so long as Congress clearly stated its intention to act
retroactively.152 Although distasteful, a civil statute like Klein’s
appropriations proviso would not have been prohibited because of
its retroactivity either at the time Klein was decided or today. As
a result, an enforceable Klein principle cannot be based on an
aversion to retroactivity.
4. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision Based on
Political Motives?
For all its opacity, the Klein opinion clearly acknowledges the
strongest counterargument to its result: Congress directed the
dismissal of suits like Klein’s by altering federal court jurisdiction
and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, over which it noted
that “the legislature has complete control.”153 What made the
appropriations proviso invalid—an exception to, or limitation on,
Congress’s broad authority—was the fact that it did “not intend to
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end.”154 It
seems, then, that the Court objected to Congress’s motive behind
its withdrawal of jurisdiction. Put otherwise, the Court suggested
that some motivations for withdrawing jurisdiction are invalid and
would not be enforced. An internal limitation on Congress’s power
over federal court jurisdiction, as suggested by Klein,155 does
comport with the Constitution’s language.156 As Leonard Ratner
argued, in order for an exception from jurisdiction to remain an

Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 302–
03 (2016) (same).
152. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (declining to
give retroactive effect to statute absent a clear statement by Congress).
153. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
154. Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 147 (holding that Congress’s power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts does not apply when the limitation is
only a means to an end).
156. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that the “Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions, and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make”).
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“exception,” it must not be so broad as to swallow the general grant
of jurisdiction.157
If Congress’s motive was objectionable, it was because, as the
Klein Court stated plainly, Congress’s goal was to deny the effect
of the president’s pardon power.158 Generalizing from the Court’s
statement, commentators have suggested that, even outside the
specific context of jurisdiction and the pardon power, 159 the proviso
was objectionable because it directed the Court to do something
otherwise unconstitutional. In Daniel Meltzer’s phrase, Congress
may not compel the courts “to speak a constitutional untruth.”160
157. Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 169 (1960) (arguing that an exception
presumes the existence of a general rule); see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman,
A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37
GA. L. REV. 893, 973 (2003) (same).
158. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145–46.
159. Even reading Klein as a limitation only on Congress’s power to withdraw
jurisdiction for political reasons is likely too broad to be accurate. In Ex Parte
McCardle, just a few years before Klein, and also authored by Chief Justice Chase,
the Court upheld a jurisdiction-stripping act that threatened to interfere with the
Radical Republican political agenda. 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868); see also Daniel
Meltzer, The Story of Ex Parte McCardle, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 71–74
(2010) [hereinafter Meltzer, McCardle]. The Court held that it was “not at liberty
to inquire into the motives of the legislature.” McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514. “We can
only examine into its power under the Constitution, and the power to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”
Id. at 513–14. There is certainly debate over how seriously to take McCardle’s
strong assertion of Congress’s authority under the Exceptions Clause. McCardle
itself can be read more narrowly in light of the fact that the Court suggested, and
later confirmed, that a habeas petitioner could prevail under the Judiciary Act of
1789 despite the Court’s narrow reading of the jurisdiction-stripping act. Meltzer,
McCardle, supra, at 83. Viewed in this light, McCardle can be reconciled with
Klein if Klein means only that a court may not withdraw jurisdiction to direct a
particular result based on the motivation of Congress if there is no other avenue
for relief. Even this most narrow reading of Klein, however, is in tension with the
Court’s subsequent rule of decision cases. District of Columbia v. Eslin,
183 U.S. 62, 65–66 (1901).
160. Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2540. See Jackson,
supra note 11, at 586 (arguing that Klein might prevent Congress from legislating
“to require courts to act unconstitutionally”); Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional
Control over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New Threat to James
Madison’s Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 439 (2000) (arguing that “Congress
cannot direct courts to make decisions that are inconsistent with the Court’s own
interpretation of the Constitution”); Tyler, supra note 54, at 113 (arguing that
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In Lawrence Sager’s formulation, Klein stands for the proposition
that Congress may not “conscript the judiciary in a constitutional
charade” by forcing it to “act out a . . . morality play.”161 A principle
that prevents Congress from directing the courts to undertake an
unconstitutional act is an important limitation on Congress; but,
it is a principle derivative of the well-established rule that the
judiciary is tasked with stating what the Constitution requires.162
In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”163 This is an important principle to be sure, but one that does
not suggest that Klein has any independent force. Rather, this
reading of Klein may merely restate an obvious principle of
constitutional law.
A motivation-based explanation of Klein can also be stated in
nonconstitutional terms. First, a nonconstitutional version of
Sager’s morality play formulation of Klein prohibits Congress, out
of political motivation, from requiring the courts to reach a
conclusion that the courts lawfully would have been permitted to
reach in the absence of specific direction by Congress. Klein can be
read in this way: the appropriations proviso was motivated, in
part, by the desire of Radical Republicans in Congress to undo
Padelford, which had smoothed the way for repentant rebels to
recover funds from the Treasury.164 Viewed in this light, the
appropriations proviso can be seen as an attempt by Congress to
give a politically motivated but otherwise constitutional act—
denying compensation to former rebels—the veneer of neutrality
by involving the federal courts. This reading of Klein is also
suggested by Young, who argued that Klein might be read to

“Congress may not compel the courts to play an instrumental part in violating”
the Constitution).
161. Sager, supra note 11, at 2528.
162. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (considering whether Klein
states a principle different than Marbury).
163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). This is, in substance,
Meltzer’s argument. Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2549
(arguing that Klein should be read to mean that Congress may not require a
federal court to act unconstitutionally).
164. See Tyler, supra note 54, at 91, 94–95 (providing historical context for
Klein).
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prohibit Congress from tampering with judicial fact-finding, even
in nonconstitutional cases.165
Although the nonconstitutional morality play reading of Klein
comports with the notion of separation of powers at a high level of
abstraction, its explanatory power is limited. In a sense, all trials
are morality plays.166 As Stephanos Bibas has described, trials
further the substantive aims of the law by allowing the community
to pronounce judgment, exonerate the innocent, “brand” the guilty,
and even reintegrate the guilty into society.167 This is precisely how
Congress relates to the judiciary whenever it enacts law. By
enacting substantive law, Congress establishes societal rules
about acceptable and unacceptable conduct.168 And by extending
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims, Congress enlists the courts in
making a public demonstration of the acceptability vel non of the
behavior adjudicated. As a result, if the statute that Congress
enacts is constitutional, a morality play test cannot distinguish a
Klein situation from any other lawmaking. Bank Markazi stands
as a clear example of lawmaking as morality play. In that case, the
Court upheld, against a Klein challenge, a statute that deemed the
assets of the Iranian Central Bank to be the assets of the republic
of Iran, against which there were outstanding but uncollected
judgments for damages resulting from terrorist activities.169 This
situation, no less than Klein, forced the Court to carry Congress’s
165. See Young, Klein, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 314–15 (suggesting
a limited congressional role in prescribing rules of interpretation).
166. See J.D. MORTON, THE FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW IN 1962, at 30 (1962)
(comparing the aspects of trials to the aspects of plays); see also Stephanos Bibas,
Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The
Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1401 (2003)
(discussing the dramatic elements of trials); cf. Milner S. Ball, The Play’s the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 81, 98–99 (1975) (discussing the contrast between trials and morality
plays).
167. Bibas, supra note 166, at 1401.
168. See MORTON, supra note 166, at 35–37 (describing the relationship
between law and societal norms).
169. See generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). A more
limited claim suggests that Klein prevents the conscription of courts in times of
deep political dysfunction, as was Reconstruction. Wasserman, supra note 11, at
215–16. If this ever was a constitutional principle, the Court appears to have
definitively rejected it in Bank Markazi.
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banner in an overtly political, even partisan, fight, by requiring it
to assign legal liability based on Congress’s moral judgment that
the Iranian bank was responsible for the country of Iran’s acts of
terrorism.170
Second, a similar argument suggests that Klein prevents
Congress from deceiving the electorate about the manner in which
its legislation alters the legal landscape. Under Martin Redish and
Christopher Pudelski’s reading, Klein was defective because it led
the electorate to believe that the decision to deny Klein’s claim was
a legal decision, cloaked in the authority of neutrality, rather than
a political one.171 This prevented, the argument goes, the electorate
from holding politicians accountable for the denial of Klein’s
claim.172 But, the deception formulation is too broad to distinguish
Klein from ordinary lawmaking. The deception model of Klein
assumes that the electorate is familiar with the standing,
generally applicable law while at the same time unable to
understand the import of a change in the law.173 Consider Klein
itself: the deception model assumes that the electorate would have
been aware of the requirements of the ACPA and the Court’s
Padelford opinion interpreting it, but unaware that the
appropriations proviso altered those conditions. The assumption
that the public pays much attention at all to Congress’s legislative
activities is contradicted by political science literature, which has
found that “Americans are almost totally uninformed about
legislative issues in Washington.”174 So, too, they are unaware of
the role of the judiciary.175 A fortiori, it is implausible that the
170. See generally Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. 1310.
171. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 439 (arguing that Klein can be
read to require the judiciary to prevent Congress from deceiving the electorate);
see also Vladek, supra note 11, at 253 (same).
172. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 439–40 (arguing that “the
judiciary has the constitutional power and obligation to assure that Congress has
not deceived the electorate”).
173. See id. at 453 (suggesting that courts proceed on the assumption that the
“electorate is aware of all legislation enacted by its chosen representatives”).
174. Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in
Congress, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45, 47 (1963).
175. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding
of and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 899–900 (2007)
(concluding that public knowledge about the judiciary is minimal).
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public would be aware both of generally applicable laws and
Supreme Court interpretations of these laws but unaware of
subsequent amendments to limit them. Wheeling Bridge stands as
a poignant example of the limitations of the deception model. No
less than Klein, the Wheeling Bridge statute can be said to have
deceived the public by implying that the decision to dissolve the
injunction against the bridge company was a legal decision rather
than a political one.176 Nevertheless, the Court upheld this statute,
a decision that was specifically reaffirmed in Klein.177
5. May Congress Direct the Court to Rule in Favor of the
Government?
Klein contains two statements suggesting the infirmity of a
statute with the effect of deciding a suit in the government’s favor.
Chase noted that the proviso could not be given effect because it
would permit “one party to the controversy to decide it in its own
favor.”178 Chase later returned to this theme, denouncing the
proviso for withdrawing the Court’s jurisdiction “because and only
because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be
adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor.”179
These statements have led some scholars to contemplate a
Klein principle that prevents the courts from applying a change in
law that has the effect of destroying a judgment rendered against
the government.180 Such a rule has intuitive appeal. As Amy
Ronner noted, the concept of rule of law, at a high level of
176. See generally Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S
421 (1855).
177. Id. at 431–32. As Young has suggested, the deception formulation is also
practically “unworkable” and “unmanageable.” Young, Klein, Then and Now,
supra note 11, at 327–28.
178. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
179. Id. at 147.
180. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 586 (interpreting Klein to mean that
Congress cannot deprive courts of the authority necessary to render independent
judgment); see also Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 447–48 (rejecting the
importance of the government as a party to Klein); Theodore Eisenberg,
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE
L.J. 498, 526–27 (1974) (same); Shugerman, supra note 157, at 978 (noting the
tension between a self-dealing rationale for Klein and Robertson).
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abstraction at least, is inconsistent with the idea of the
“government securing for itself a [judicial] victory by a
Congressional change.”181 Accordingly, Ronner proposed a Klein
test that would consider, as a factor but not a determinative one,
whether the statute has the effect of favoring the government.182
Peter Gerangelos reformulated Ronner’s test, incorporating her
emphasis on the government’s decision to decide the case in its own
favor.183 Gordon Young conducted the most elaborate evaluation of
a Klein principle that turns on the presence of the government as
a party.184 Young suggests that this reading of Klein is explained
as an extension of the principle against nonjudicial revision of
court judgments.185 A rule taking into consideration the presence
of the government as a party finds support in United States v.
Sioux Nation of Indians,186 in which the Court upheld a special
jurisdictional statute that waived the government’s defense of res
judicata.187 The Court distinguished the facts of Sioux Nation from
Klein by emphasizing that Klein’s appropriations proviso resolved
the controversy in favor of the government.188 By contrast, the
Sioux Nation jurisdictional statute imposed a new legal obligation
on the government.189
Despite Sioux Nation, the greater weight of scholarship has
been less optimistic about the possibility of reading Klein to turn
on whether the change in law redounds to the benefit of the
181. Ronner, supra note 11, at 1071–72.
182. See id. at 1071 (arguing that whether “legislation has the effect of
favoring the government as a party” is a factor in Klein).
183. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 178–79 (proposing
a test for determining the legality of legislation directing judgment).
184. See Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1241–44
(evaluating the significance of the presence of the government as a party to a
pending case).
185. See id. at 1247–48 (suggesting that Klein follows from the principle
against nonjudicial revision of court judgments).
186. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
187. See id. at 407 (upholding a change of law in a pending case).
188. See id. at 404–05 (noting that the it was of “obvious importance to the
Klein holding . . . that Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at issue
in the Government’s own favor”).
189. See id. at 401, 406–07 (describing the jurisdictional statute in Sioux
Nation).
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government. Most forcefully, Jackson and Eisenberg point to
District of Columbia v. Eslin,190 in which the Court upheld a
withdrawal of jurisdiction that had the effect of nullifying
judgments payable by the United States.191 Eslin would seem to
preclude a broad reading of Klein to prohibit withdrawals of
jurisdiction that favor the United States in pending cases.
Nevertheless, Jackson does incorporate such a principle into her
proposed Klein rule, suggesting that Klein may prevent Congress
from legislating to “force the courts to rule in favor of the
government” by depriving them of the power to express their
independent legal judgment.192 As Jackson notes, however,
subsequent decisions limit the force of this potential explanation
of Klein by permitting Congress to define the scope of law so
narrowly as to effectively eliminate the court’s independent legal
judgment.193
The more recent Robertson case also challenges a reading of
Klein that would prohibit Congress from enacting a statute with
the effect of directing a ruling in favor of the government. In
Robertson, environmental and logging industry groups brought
suits against the United States to challenge the government’s
management of logging activities in Oregon.194 During the
litigation, Congress enacted a statute to govern logging in the
Oregon forests that had the effect of ending the ongoing litigation
in favor of the United States.195 The Court upheld the new statute
against a Klein challenge:196 As Jed Shugerman argued, Robertson
precludes reading Klein as a broad prohibition on changes in law
simply because they have the effect of directing judgment in favor
of the United States.197
190. 183 U.S. 62 (1901).
191. See id. at 65–66; see also Jackson, supra note 11, at 585–86 (noting the
tension between Eslin and Klein); Eisenberg, supra note 180, at 526 (same).
192. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 587.
193. See id. at 586–87 (arguing that the difference between prescribing a new
rule of decision and directing a particular judgment “is in some measure a matter
of form”).
194. See generally Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 433
(1992).
195. Id. at 434–36.
196. Id. at 441.
197. See Shugerman, supra note 157, at 978–79 (noting the tension between
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Doctrine aside, other scholars are skeptical of the relevance of
the presence of the government as a party even as a theoretical
matter. Redish argued that constitutional theory suggests no
reason why Congress may not enact statutes that have the effect
of favoring the government in pending cases.198 Redish is surely
correct to doubt the Klein Court’s bald assertion that the
appropriations proviso was defective simply because it allowed
“one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor.”199 In a
number of contexts, our constitutional system appears to tolerate
almost literal violations of a principle that would prevent an entity
from deciding a controversy in its own favor.200 For example, in the
context of administrative law, administrative agencies hear
countless disputes each year in which an agency, acting both as
party and adjudicating authority,201 decides a dispute in its own
favor. Gerangelos, although sympathetic to the argument that the
presence of the government as a party should matter, argued that
this proposition is not supported by authority other than Klein
itself.202
For these reasons, it is important not to overstate the
argument that Klein turns on the presence of the government as a
party or the fact that the statute rendered judgment in the
government’s favor. If these facts have any continued relevance,
they must be situated within a defensible theoretical and doctrinal
framework. As I argue in Part III, this is possible: a principle
disfavoring governmental self-dealing, which takes these facts into
Klein and Robertson).
198. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (arguing that Congress may
change the law to benefit the government as a party in a pending case); see also
Ratner, supra note 157, at 181 (discussing tension between Klein and McCardle).
199. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
200. See Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of
Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 393–94 (2012) [hereinafter Vermuele, Contra
Nemo] (arguing that the “structural features of the constitutional system” violate
an absolute reading of the nemo iudex principle).
201. See id. at 393 (asserting that conflicts of interest are a feature of the
administrative state); see also 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012) (permitting agencies to
adjudicate disputes involving the agencies themselves).
202. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 184–85 (arguing
that Klein is the only case suggesting the relevance of the presence of the
government as a party to a pending case).
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account, has deep roots in constitutional history, doctrine, and
jurisprudence.203
A
principle
disfavoring
governmental
self-dealing also provides a framework for examining Eslin and
Robertson and demonstrates how these cases differ from Klein. But
more on that later. First, we must confront the possibility that
Klein means nothing at all.
6. Might Klein Mean Nothing at All?
It is possible, of course, that Klein means nothing—or at least
nothing that can be called a distinct and enforceable principle
concerning the relationship between Congress and the courts.204
Scholars have argued, alternatively, that Klein is no broader than
its exceptions, that it stands only for a rule already clear from
other constitutional principles, and that it is merely a formal
drafting requirement.
First, Klein might be no broader than its exceptions. Even at
the time it was decided, the possible range of applications for Klein
was quite small. In the early case of United States v. Schooner
Peggy,205 the Court held that courts must apply changes of law to
cases pending on appeal.206 In that case, the district court had
condemned the Schooner Peggy.207 While the case was pending on
appeal, the United States entered into a treaty with France that
203. See infra Part III.
204. At least, Klein is still good law for its holding that the appropriations
proviso was invalid because it encroached on the President’s pardon power. This
is not, however, the full extent of Klein. See Witkowski v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl.
393, 396–97 (1872) (noting that Klein is not limited to the line between executive
and legislative power). In subsequent cases, the Court has considered Klein in the
context of the division of labor between the judicial and legislative departments.
See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1315 (2016) (discussing Klein
in the context of the legislative direction of judgment).
205. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
206. Id. at 110. The Schooner Peggy case comports with the traditional view
that courts, discovering rather than making law, declare what the law was as well
as what the law is. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70–72 (noting that
judges are “not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound
the old one”).
207. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 108 (noting that the vessel had
been condemned by the trial court).
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the Court interpreted as requiring the return of the vessel in spite
of the condemnation.208 The Court held that an appellate court was
bound to apply the new treaty, even if the trial court decision was
correct when decided.209 When “subsequent to the judgment and
before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the [new] law must be
obeyed.”210 This requirement is often referred to as the “Changed
Law Rule.”211
Klein can be read as an exception to Schooner Peggy,212
restricting the application of new law in pending cases on appeal
in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, this reading is precluded
by subsequent cases, in which the Court inverted the relationship
between Schooner Peggy and Klein by expanding the “Changed
Law Rule” into a wholesale exception to Klein.213 In Robertson, the
Court implied that the Changed Law Rule was an exception to
Klein by holding that Congress may always amend or repeal
existing law, even for the purpose of ending ongoing litigation.214
Later, in Plaut, the Court explicitly made the Changed Law Rule
an exception to Klein, holding that its “prohibition does not take
hold when Congress amend[s] applicable law.”215 And, in Bank
Markazi, the Court completed the transformation, relying on the
Changed Law Rule to reach its result. The Court held that Klein
did not prohibit a statute deeming one entity’s assets available to
satisfy judgments against another because, by defining the assets

208. Id. at 108–09.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 110.
211. See Gerangelos, Pending Cases, supra note 119, at 84 (referring to the
above-mentioned principle as “the changed law rule”); see also Richard Doidge, Is
Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking
United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 959 (1994) (same).
212. See Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1240–41 (reading
Klein as an exception to the Changed Law Rule).
213. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 436, 441 (1992)
(noting that Klein does not apply when Congress has amended the law).
214. See id. at 440 (noting that Congress may end litigation by amending the
law).
215. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (internal
citations omitted).
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in reference to the funds identified in a pending case, Congress had
amended applicable law.216
Bank Markazi appears to confirm, as others have already
argued, that the Changed Law Rule swallowed Klein altogether.
Describing the status of Klein after Robertson, William Araiza
argued that all lawmaking changes the law within the meaning of
Klein: “[I]f lawmaking is the power to create liability rules and the
procedural structure for enforcing those rules, then overturning a
statutory interpretation and amending the underlying statute
both constitute lawmaking.”217 Araiza’s interpretation has been
borne out by a number of post-Robertson lower court cases that
illustrate the vanishingly small space between amending
applicable law, which is permissible, and prescribing a rule of
decision in causes pending, which is prohibited.218 In City of New
York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,219 the Second Circuit upheld, over a
Klein challenge, a statute that terminated identifiable pending
cases against gun suppliers.220 The City of New York filed suit
against firearms suppliers, claiming that they created a public
nuisance.221 While this case was pending, Congress enacted the
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,222 which required the
immediate dismissal of pending claims against manufacturers or
sellers of firearms.223 Although this statute directed the dismissal
of particular, pending cases, the court held that the statute also
“change[d] the applicable law” because it eliminated liability for
the defendants in those cases: As a result, it did not violate
Klein.224 The Second Circuit is not alone; similar cases in the Ninth
216.
217.

Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016).
Araiza, supra note 7119, at 1079; see also GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL
PROCESS, supra note 11, at 175 (noting that Robertson is in tension with Klein);
Vermeule, supra note 28, at 424 (same).
218. See generally City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d.
Cir. 2008) (upholding a statute that both amends the law and prescribes a rule of
decision).
219. 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008).
220. See generally id.
221. Id. at 389.
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
223. See Beretta, 524 F.3d at 389 (citing the Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903).
224. Id. at 396.
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Circuit and D.C. Circuit reveal that any statute, perhaps, can be
read as amending applicable law and, as a result, skirt the already
modest restrictions imposed by Klein.225
Chief Justice Roberts made this same point in his dissenting
opinion in Bank Markazi. The Court distinguished the Bank
Markazi statute from a hypothetical statute declaring that “Smith
wins” on the ground that the latter, impermissible statute “would
create no new substantive law.”226 The Chief Justice responded
that such a statute does in fact create new substantive law: the
statute provides the new, substantive law that Smith wins.227
Noting that “[c]hanging the law is simply how Congress acts,”
Roberts concluded that describing one statute rather than another
as changing the law is merely conclusory.228 If a “change in law”
has the broad meaning attributed to it by Roberts, then an
exception to Klein contingent on whether Congress has changed
the law is coextensive with Klein itself.
Second, a number of scholars have formulated Klein principles
that are no broader than already existing constitutional rules.
Most relevantly, a number of scholars have suggested that
Congress may not compel the courts to make untrue statements
about the law, whether constitutional or otherwise.229 Hart
suggested that, at least, Congress may not grant federal courts
jurisdiction contingent on the requirement that they refrain from
declaring a particular law unconstitutional.230 Meltzer argued that
225. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Klein does not take hold when Congress amends applicable law); Nat’l Coal. to
Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same).
226. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
227. Id. (“Saying Congress ‘creates new law’ in one case but not another
simply expresses a conclusion on that issue.”). If there is a difference between
“Smith wins” and a change in “substantive law,” it has to do with the specificity
of the statute. But, Bank Markazi strongly suggests that particularity is no longer
an issue. See id. at 1327 (discussing targeted legislation).
228. Id. at 1335.
229. See Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2540 (“Congress
may not compel the courts to speak a constitutional untruth.”); see also Young,
Klein, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 314–15 (discussing the limits of
congressional power to require particular findings of fact); Jackson, supra note
11, at 586 (stating that Congress may not force courts to act unconstitutionally).
230. See Hart, supra note 622, at 1373 (discussing the line between rendering
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Klein may prevent Congress from compelling the courts “to speak
a constitutional untruth.”231 Similarly, Jackson suggested that
Klein might prevent Congress from legislating “to require courts to
act unconstitutionally.”232 As noted above, this is an important
principle, but one that does not need Klein as an independent
source. It is already implicit in Marbury v. Madison’s233 statement
that it is the duty of the courts to “say what the law is.”234
Third, scholars have argued that Klein is no more than a
formal drafting requirement. Under this view, Klein does not
prevent Congress from doing anything in particular, but it may
prevent Congress from doing it in a particular way.235 As Evan
Caminker and Lawrence Sager have explained, it is easy to replace
language that directs the courts to rule in favor of one party with
language that guarantees the same result by changing the
substantive law.236 Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s Bank Markazi
hypothetical. If, during the pendency of Smith v. Jones, Congress
enacts a statute that says “in the case of Smith v. Jones, Smith
wins,” both the Court and Roberts, and probably federal courts
scholars like Caminker and Sager, would agree that Klein was
violated.237 But, imagine further that the case of Smith v. Jones
was a breach of contract action in which the only issue was Jones’s
judgment and actually deciding a case); GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra
note 11, at 127 (same).
231. Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2540.
232. Jackson, supra note 11, at 586.
233. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
234. Id. at 177. Others have suggested that Klein requires that courts must
be allowed to use “minimally fair procedures.” Young, Klein, Then and Now, supra
note 11, at 310. This is an important rule, but probably one that is no broader
than what due process requires. See id. at 308–09 (“This places Klein in what is
usually the realm of procedural due process.”).
235. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that Klein is a drafting
requirement).
236. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that a change in
substantive law can effectively direct judgment in a particular case); Sager, supra
note 11, at 2526 (same); Gerangelos, Pending Cases, supra note 119, at 84 (same);
Doidge, supra note 211, at 926 (same).
237. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335–36 (2016) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional directives to reach a particular
result are unconstitutional); Caminker, supra note 11, at 541–42 (suggesting that
Klein may be a drafting principle preventing overly specific direction to courts).
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defense that he lacked capacity to contract. A statute providing “in
the case of Smith v. Jones, the defense of lack of capacity to
contract is abolished” changes the underlying substantive law.
Although this statute would guarantee the outcome in a pending
case, it also would avoid Klein’s restrictions under the
Robertson-Bank Markazi version of the Changed Law Rule. The
Bank Markazi majority responded to a similar hypothetical by
noting that it might be unconstitutional, irrespective of Klein,
because the legislature is bound to be reasonable.238 The Court’s
response is all but an admission that Klein has no force as an
independent constitutional principle, but rather is a formality
easily evaded by competent drafting.
These arguments strongly suggest that Klein no longer stands
for an independent and enforceable principle about the
relationship between Congress and the courts. Although the Court
has not overruled Klein explicitly, the Court sometimes implicitly
overrules an old case or allows it to fade away.239 Indeed, one could
read Eslin, a case remarkable because of its similarity to Klein but
which fails to distinguish it, or even to cite it, as evidence of Klein’s
irrelevance.240 It is also possible to read Robertson and Plaut, both
of which made short work of Klein arguments,241 as a signal that it
is no longer viable.
But Bank Markazi suggests that Klein is neither gone nor
forgotten. Instead, the Court seemed genuinely to wrestle with
Klein and the other rule of decision cases to discern a workable line
that distinguishes the direction of judgment from a change in
substantive law.242 The Court tried to situate Klein within the
broader context of Article III, explain the significance of its “rule
238. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326 (noting that a narrowly tailored
law may be irrational and, therefore, unconstitutional).
239. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by Implication, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 151, 154 (2009) (noting that the Court “sometimes overrules prior holdings
only by implication”).
240. See generally District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901).
241. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995)
(invalidating a statute that reopened final judgments without resting on Klein);
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (restricting Klein to
circumstances in which Congress has not amended applicable law).
242. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323–26 (drawing a distinction between
changing substantive law and directing judgment).
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of decision” language, and reconcile its result with Schooner Peggy,
Robertson, and Plaut, among other cases.243 In short, the Court
treated the Klein rule of decision principle as a principle of
constitutional dimension. Because the Court continues to regard
Klein as a case of constitutional importance, and because Klein
reflects a strong intuition about the separation of legislative power
from judicial power, it is worth exploring whether sense can be
made of this puzzling opinion. For the purposes of the rest of this
Article, therefore, I explore what principle animates Klein,
assuming that it still represents an enforceable constitutional
principle.
III. Back into Klein’s Vault
Bank Markazi is a double-edged sword for the federal courts
enthusiast seeking an enforceable Klein principle. On one hand,
Bank Markazi, once again, failed to find a Klein violation in a
statute that all but guaranteed the result in a pending case.244 And
the Court rejected, for the first time, the infirmity of legislative
specification as a possible justification for Klein, undermining the
persuasive argument that Klein is rooted in concerns about
targeted legislative action.245 On the other hand, the Court seemed
to take Klein seriously, raising the possibility that Klein stands for
an enforceable principle that has not been adequately
articulated.246 A return to Klein’s vault—that is, a look into the
reasoning underlying the Court’s cryptic opinion in that case—
reveals that if Klein can be justified today, it can best be viewed as
a principle that prohibits governmental self-dealing.
A principle against governmental self-dealing builds on the
work of scholars, including Vicki Jackson, Gordon Young, Peter
Gerangelos, and Amy Ronner, who identified and evaluated the
possibility that Klein turns on whether the government is a party

243. See id. at 1323–25 (situating Klein among other separation of powers
cases).
244. See id. at 1325 (upholding statute against Klein challenge).
245. See id. at 1328 (rejecting the argument that legislation affecting very few
cases is necessarily unconstitutional).
246. See id. at 1334 (discussing Klein).

2174

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017)

to the dispute.247 As noted above, this latter argument faces
significant challenges. It is difficult to square with subsequent rule
of decision cases like Robertson and Eslin, and it is not clear where
it fits within the American constitutional tradition. A Klein
principle against governmental self-dealing must grapple with
these objections. This Part introduces a constitutional principle
against governmental self-dealing and demonstrates its
connection to Klein. It concludes by proposing a Klein rule of
decision principle that comports with the language of Klein and
situates it within the strong constitutional tradition disfavoring
governmental self-dealing in other contexts.248 Part IV
demonstrates the explanatory power of a Klein principle against
governmental self-dealing by applying it to the rule of decision
cases most in tension with it.249 Part V provides guidance to lower
courts by demonstrating how a Klein principle against
governmental self-dealing can apply to cases that will arise in the
future.250
A. What is Self-Dealing?
Before describing how a principle against self-dealing can
solve Klein’s rule of decision puzzle, it is necessary to define
self-dealing and explain how self-dealing can apply to an
institution like Congress.
1. Self-Dealing in the American Constitutional Tradition
A person self-deals when he takes an official action to confer a
private benefit on himself.251 Self-dealing in the context of public

247. Supra Part II.C.5.
248. See infra Part III (introducing a principle against governmental selfdealing).
249. See infra Part IV (applying the principle against self-dealing to existing
cases).
250. See infra Part V (applying the principle against self-dealing to
hypothetical cases).
251. See KERNAGHAN & LANGFORD, supra note 34, at 142–43 (defining
self-dealing).
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office, a special case of political corruption,252 has long been
disfavored in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Dr. Bonham’s
Case,253 an English authority better known for its lasting effect on
American legal philosophy than on British law, is often cited as a
source for an American principle against governmental
self-dealing.254 In Bonham’s Case, Chief Judge Coke opined that
the Royal College of Physicians did not have the power to fine and
imprison Bonham for practicing medicine in London without the
College’s permission.255 Coke reasoned that members of the
College “cannot be judges, ministers, and parties; judges to give
sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties to
have the moiety of the forfeiture.”256 Viewing Dr. Bonham’s Case
through the lens of self-dealing, the problem with the institutional
arrangement of the College of Physicians was that its members
both had the power to fine Dr. Bonham and stood to benefit from
the fines imposed by the College.257
Coke’s disapproval of official self-dealing resonated with
republican principles espoused during the revolutionary period.258
252. See Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, at 373–74
(describing political corruption to include self-interested use of public power);
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 38 (describing corruption
as the exercise of public prerogatives for private gain); Balkin, supra note 33, at
49–50 (describing republicanism and the public good).
253. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610).
254. See id. at 652 (invalidating institutional arrangement that reflected
self-dealing); see also Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 384–86 n.6
(noting connection between Bonham’s Case and a principle against self-dealing);
see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428–29 (1995)
(suggesting the importance of a principle against self-dealing); Brian C. Kalt,
Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons,
106 YALE L.J. 779, 787 (1996) (describing self-dealing in constitutional design); cf.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91–92 (noting that “it is unreasonable
that any man should determine his own quarrel”).
255. See Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 646 (holding that the college did not
have the power to fine and imprison Bonham); R.H. Helmholz, Bonham’s Case,
Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 326 (2009)
(discussing Coke’s opinion).
256. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
257. Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 384–86 & n.6 (noting the
connection between Bonham’s Case and a principle against self-dealing).
258. See Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, at 373–74
(describing views about self-dealing in the eighteenth century); TEACHOUT,
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In Calder v. Bull,259 the early Supreme Court echoed Dr. Bonham’s
Case when reasoning that a law that “makes a man a Judge in his
own cause” is “contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, [and] cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority.”260 The Court’s statement in Calder reflected
the republican virtue of “disinterestedness” that preoccupied the
generation that framed the Constitution.261 This principle suggests
that citizens who are free from financial dependence are best able
to execute their official duties impartially.262 Members of the
revolutionary generation idealized the Roman hero Cincinnatus,
who served his country when he was needed and then, refusing
official rewards, returned to civilian life when his service was
complete.263 And if they idealized Cincinnatus, they idolized
George Washington, the “American Cincinnatus” who both refused
compensation for serving as head of the Continental Army and
later resigned his military commission to the Continental
Congress at the end of the War of Independence.264 To many
members of the revolutionary generation, public offices were
burdens to be borne by exceptional citizens, like Washington,
rather than plum posts to be exploited.265
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 9 (describing American views of
corruption); PARILLO, supra note 33, at 9 (describing eighteenth century American
aspiration to separate governmental power from individual interests).
259. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
260. Id. at 388.
261. See GORDON WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS, supra note 38, at 16–
20 (describing the virtue of disinterestedness); PARILLO, supra note 33, at 10
(describing the civic republican ideal of official disinterestedness).
262. See Gordon Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American
Revolution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 23–26 (1990) [hereinafter Wood, Classical
Republicanism] (discussing the connection between financial independence and
disinterestedness); PARILLO, supra note 33, at 9–10 (describing American
attitudes about the financial security of public officials).
263. See Jason S. Lantzer, Washington as Cincinnatus: A Model of
Leadership, in GEORGE WASHINGTON: FOUNDATION OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
AND CHARACTER 33 (2001) (describing parallels between the lives of George
Washington and Cincinnatus ).
264. See id. at 41–43 (describing deliberate retirement of Washington from
public life).
265. See WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS, supra note 38, at 16–20
(discussing attitudes toward class and public office in the eighteenth century); see
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None of these idealized images of the members of the
generation that framed the Constitution should suggest that
public actors during this period were immaculately free from
self-interest. Nicholas Parillo has shown that the revolutionary
generation’s belief in official disinterestedness coexisted with
behaviors that modern sensibilities would classify as
self-dealing.266 For example, customs officers received a share of
goods that were forfeited, creating an incentive for the officers to
confiscate goods. Perhaps even more surprisingly, prosecutors
“received a fee for every case they brought to trial,” encouraging
more prosecutions.267 Indeed, even Washington, normally so
scrupulous about his public reputation, undertook official decisions
that benefitted him personally.268 When he chose the location for
the federal district that would become the District of Columbia, he
picked an area in close proximity to land owned by him and his
family.269 The result, as Washington foresaw, was “an immediate
rise in the value of his land.”270
This mixed historical record complicates the story of
self-dealing during the framing period. Nevertheless, in certain
key ways, the republican “dream” of separating government power

also Wood, Classical Republicanism, supra note 262, at 23–24 (describing the
obligation of exceptional men to hold office in the revolutionary era).
266. See PARILLO, supra note 33, at 40–42 (describing the eighteenth century
practice of providing bounties and moieties to public officers for performing the
duties of public office).
267. Id.
268. See Tillman, supra note 35, at 764–66 (describing George Washington’s
business transactions with the government).
269. See BOWLING, supra note 35, at 213–14 (arguing that Washington had an
economic interest in the placement of the capital).
270. Id. at 214. Just as Washington alternately exhibited disinterested and
self-interested behavior, so too did other prominent members of the framing
generation. John Marshall famously recused himself from Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), because he had a small but personal stake
in the outcome of the case. See SMITH, supra note 38, at 429 (describing Marshall’s
decision to recuse himself). Earlier, however, he authored Marbury v. Madison,
although it was his omission, as Secretary of State, that was responsible for
Marbury failing to receive his commission. See ALBERT JEREMIAH BEVERIDGE, 3
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 124 (1919) (describing historical background of
Marbury v. Madison).
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from self-interest271 survived the realities of its lived experience.
Madison defended the structure of the proposed United States
government on the theory that the design of its institutions would
minimize self-dealing.272 As Publius, Madison argued that “[n]o
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt
his integrity.”273 From this simple premise, Madison advanced a
system of representative democracy to minimize the ill effects of
self-interested decision-making.274
Aside from the overall structure of the government, a number
of other clauses of the Constitution confirm the importance of
minimizing self-dealing to the American constitutional tradition.
The Constitution precludes the Vice President from presiding over
a Senate trial of a President who has been impeached.275 This
clause can best be explained as an anti-self-dealing device.
Because the Vice President would benefit personally and directly
from the conviction and removal of the President, the Constitution
precludes the official involvement of the Vice President in the
process.276 Similarly, the Constitution’s Twenty-Seventh
Amendment (proposed, incidentally, in 1789) prevents a pay raise
for Congress from taking effect until after an intervening
congressional election.277 This Amendment prevents all members
of the House and some members of the Senate from voting for a
raise that they will necessarily enjoy.278 Akhil Amar has argued
that even the Bill of Rights, normally considered to be a protection
for individual rights against the majority, may also be viewed as a

271. See PARILLO, supra note 33, at 9 (describing the early American
aspiration of dividing private interests from public power).
272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that the Chief Justice shall
preside over proceedings when the President is tried in the Senate).
276. See Amar & Amar, supra note 41, at 121–22 (arguing that the
Constitution is designed, in part, to prevent self-dealing).
277. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law varying the compensation for
the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened.”).
278. Id. (delaying the effect of changes in congressional compensation).
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way to prevent governmental self-dealing.279 The First
Amendment, for example, protects speech and petition, which are
ways for the people to ensure that government officials do not
insulate themselves from public scrutiny, thereby entrenching
themselves in office.280
2. Who is the “Self” in Self-Dealing?
In order to explain why a principle against self-dealing
accounts for the result in Klein, it is necessary to determine
whether the “self” that can self-deal includes an institution, like
Congress, with institutional rather than personal interests. As a
literal statement, self-dealing appears to apply only to an
individual who acts in a public capacity for his own private benefit.
The paradigmatic example is a judge deciding a case in which she
is a litigant.281
The self may be interpreted more broadly to describe a person
contributing to a decision that would confer a particular benefit on
himself.282 This is the sense in which self-dealing was the basis for
the result in Dr. Bonham’s Case.283 Members of the College could
not be “judges, ministers, and parties”284 because they benefitted
from fines paid to the College. A decision of this type is less directly
self-interested than a judge deciding a case to which she literally
is a party, but each of the College’s members had a personal, albeit
279. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on “The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution,” 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 99, 100, 105 (1992).
280. See id. (describing the structural components of the Bill of Rights).
281. See Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 384 (considering whether
there is a constitutional value preventing a person from being a judge in his own
case); Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (1610) (noting that, in the same
case, an institution’s members may not be “judges to give sentence of judgment;
ministers to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture”).
282. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520–23 (1927) (holding that a person’s
rights are violated when his case is heard by a judge who “has a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case”).
283. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646 (1610). See Vermeule, Contra
Nemo, supra note 200, at 384–86 (arguing that the principle against self-dealing
is often linked to Bonham’s Case); see also Kalt, supra note 254, at 779 (discussing
self-dealing).
284. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
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nonexclusive, interest in the outcome of the case. As a result, it is
possible to see how the arrangement at issue in Dr. Bonham’s Case
can be considered self-dealing. The Constitution speaks to
self-dealing of this variety: the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
prevents a pay raise for Congress from taking effect until after an
intervening congressional election.285
Even more broadly, self-dealing might describe a person who
contributes to a group decision that stands to benefit him only as
a member of a class, but not in his individual capacity. This is the
sense in which Madison invoked the concept when describing
legislative activities. In Federalist, No. 10, Madison wrote that
“[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity.”286 But Madison’s use of this phrase was
metaphorical because the subject of Madison’s aphorism is
legislative rather than judicial activity.287 Madison continued:
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to
be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many
of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?288

In Madison’s metaphor, legislative activities are aggregated
judicial determinations, resolving disputes among classes rather
than individuals.289 And legislators are not only the judges making
these determinations, but they are also the parties who stand to
benefit from the outcome. As Madison wrote: “Is a law proposed
concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are
parties on one side and the debtors on the other.”290 Under this
description, self-dealing might extend to legislative deliberations,
285. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened.”).
286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124–25.
287. See Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 391 (noting that
Madison’s use of phrase was metaphorical).
288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124–25.
289. See Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 391 (noting metaphorical
use of the language of judging).
290. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124–25.
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but it would still be confined to situations of “corruption,” that is,
a “self-serving use of public power for private ends.”291
But, the self-interestedness criticized by the Court in Klein did
not involve even this metaphoric use of the term “self.” The Klein
Court did not suggest that any members of Congress stood to
benefit, even as members of a class, from denying claims like
Klein’s. Members of Congress benefitted financially from the
appropriations proviso only in the de minimis sense that, as
taxpayers, they stood to share in the savings to public fisc.
Nevertheless, the Court was emphatic that the appropriations
proviso was impermissible because it allowed “one party to the
controversy to decide it in its own favor.”292 In so doing, Klein
treated Congress as the party bound by a principle against
self-dealing.293 From Klein, therefore, we learn that the “self” that
is restrained by a principle of self-dealing can be broader than a
person or class with pecuniary interest in the outcome of a dispute.
Rather, Congress as an institution may be “self-interested” when
directing a decision in favor of the United States, even if the
members that make up Congress are not.294 This type of
self-dealing, which has been called “institutional self-dealing,”295 is
the subject of Klein’s self-dealing principle.

291. Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, at 373–74.
292. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
293. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 68 (noting
extension of the principle of self-dealing to legislative activity).
294. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 898 (1996) (describing
the self-interest of the government). This is the sense in which Hamilton used
the phrase. In Federalist, No. 80, he relied on this principle to describe why
federal courts rather than state courts should hear cases between states or
citizens of different states. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 447 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Peter Smith ed., 1987) (federal rather than state tribunals should
hear cases involving states because “[n]o man ought certainly to be a judge in his
own cause”).
295. See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws,
98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1086 (2012) (describing institutional self-dealing); Vermeule,
Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 389 (same).
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B. Klein Disfavors Governmental Self-Dealing

A close look at the structure of Klein’s argument reveals that
self-dealing is the closest thing that can be considered the rationale
for its rule of decision language. Although the Court was clear that
a statute prescribing a rule of decision in a pending case was
constitutionally problematic, it did not say precisely why. After
describing the statute, the Court asks: “Can we do so [that is, apply
the proviso,] without allowing one party to the controversy to
decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the
legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial
Department of the government in cases pending before it?”296 It
answers: “We think not.”297
This passage, although far from a model of clarity, suggests
that there is something wrong with a statute that allows one party
to a controversy to decide it in its own favor. It does not, however,
explain what, if any, is the connection between this concern and its
rule of decision language. This explanation comes later, in the last
paragraph of the opinion’s rule of decision section. Summing up
the previous several pages of its opinion, Chase asks whether
Congress can “prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court
must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and
only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be
adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This
question seems to us to answer itself.”298 In this passage, the Court
ties together all of the themes it introduced throughout the opinion
until this point, including the withdrawal of jurisdiction,
prescription of a rule of decision, retroactivity, deviation from the
standing law, the motivation of Congress, and favoritism to the
government.299 But, unlike the rest of the discussion, this last
sentence suggests that all of these themes are organized around
the Court’s concern with self-dealing; that is, Congress’s
interference with the Court of Claims’s judgment was
constitutionally defective “because and only because its decision”
296. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See id. (holding that Congress overstepped the constitutional boundary
separating the legislative and judicial branches).
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was “adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor.”300 Put
another way, the Court’s concern appears to be one of self-dealing;
that is, Congress took advantage of its otherwise lawful power to
establish federal court jurisdiction to benefit itself as a party in an
ongoing dispute.
C. Self-Dealing and the Constitution
As the above analysis reveals, a principle discouraging the
government from self-dealing may explain Klein’s result. Although
it has gained relatively little scholarly or judicial traction,301 it does
reflect one of a few concerns that the Klein Court emphasized,302
and possibly was its primary concern. Of course, reading Klein as
a statement about self-dealing would be a thin explanation for its
result if Klein were unique in constitutional doctrine for stating
this principle. Redish made this objection when he argued that
constitutional doctrine and theory provide no reason to prevent
Congress from enacting statutes that have the effect of favoring
the government in pending cases.303 Gerangelos voiced the same
concern, arguing that a Klein principle that takes into account the
status of the government as a party fails to connect this insight to
other areas of constitutional law.304
But, contrary to these objections, Klein is not alone in
suggesting the constitutional importance of a principle against
self-dealing. Even apart from Klein’s rule of decision principle, a
principle against governmental self-dealing animates several lines
300. Id.
301. Cf. GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 185 (considering
the relevance of the government as a party to the Klein question); Ronner, supra
note 11, at 1071 (same); Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1249
(same).
302. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (rejecting
the proviso “because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law,
must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor”).
303. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (noting Congress’s broad
authority to benefit the government as a party in a pending case); see also Ratner,
supra note 157, at 181 (noting the tension between McCardle and Klein).
304. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 185 (arguing that
a Klein principle rooted in the distinction between government as regulator and
government as sovereign is not supported by doctrine other than Klein).
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of constitutional law cases, including Contract, Due Process, and
Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine.305 The broad commitment to
limiting governmental self-dealing described by these other
constitutional doctrines answers the objection that a Klein
principle against self-dealing is unique in constitutional law.306
These cases also provide parameters for evaluating how a value
against self-dealing could operate in the Klein context.307
1. Contract Clause Doctrine is Driven by a Principle Against
Governmental Self-Dealing.
The Supreme Court reads the Contract Clause to embody a
principle against self-dealing by state governments.308 The
Contract Clause prohibits the states from enacting any “Law
impairing the Obligations of Contract.”309 Despite the
absolute-sounding nature of its prohibition, the strictness of the
clause’s application turns on whether the statute impairs private
obligations only or instead relieves the state government of its own
obligations.310 When a state enacts a statute that impairs private
obligations, like a statute impairing mortgage obligations between
borrowers and lenders, the Court reviews the validity of the breach
under a deferential standard akin to rational basis.311 By contrast,
when the Court reviews statutes repudiating contractual

305. See infra Parts III.C.1–3 (describing the connection between
constitutional doctrine and principle against self-dealing).
306. Cf. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (arguing that constitutional
theory does not support a Klein principle that turns on whether the government
is a party to a pending case).
307. See infra Part IV (applying principle against self-dealing).
308. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (holding that
“the Contract Clause limits the power of the States to modify their own
contracts”).
309. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
310. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22–23, 29–31 (distinguishing
between modification of rights related to public contracts and private contracts).
311. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438, 444–45
(1934) (recognizing that laws intended to regulate existing contractual
relationships must be reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public
purpose).
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obligations to which the state itself is a party, it does not defer to
the state’s decision to breach its contractual obligation.312
The Court rests its distinction between public and private
contracts on the assumption that the state is an interested party
when it makes the decision to breach its own contractual
obligations.313 As the Court described in United States Trust Co. of
New York v. New Jersey,314 deference to a state’s decision to impair
contractual obligations is based on the premise that, normally, a
state is acting for a public purpose.315 There will be winners and
losers as a result of the state’s decision to breach a generally
applicable set of contractual obligations, to be sure; but the
legislature, rather than a court, is best situated to weigh the costs
and benefits created by the impairment.316 By contrast, when the
state itself is a party to a contract, deference to legislative
judgment about whether to breach that obligation is not
appropriate.317 Unlike in the case of a purely private obligation,
when the state has the ability to breach its own contractual
obligation, it has the power to pick itself as a winner.318 As a result,
the Court held, deference to the state “is not appropriate because
the State’s self-interest is at stake.”319 Because deference is not
warranted to the state’s self-interested decision, the Court
interprets the Contract Clause strictly when a state enacts
legislation breaching its own financial obligations.320 The Court
has maintained its United States Trust distinction, refusing to
312. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22–23, 29–31 (distinguishing
between modification of rights related to public contracts and private contracts).
313. See id. (holding that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest
is at stake”).
314. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
315. See id. at 25 (describing reserved powers doctrine).
316. See id. at 22–23 (noting that “courts properly defer to legislative
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure”).
317. Id. at 25–26 (holding that “complete deference . . . is not appropriate
because the State's self-interest is at stake”).
318. See id. at 26 (“If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever
it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose,
the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.”).
319. Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added).
320. Id. at 24, 26.
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uphold state breaches of contractual obligations when the state
itself is a party to the contracts it impairs.321 In light of this
distinction, which is not suggested either by the text or history of
the Contract Clause,322 the Court’s self-dealing rationale appears
to be driving the doctrinal result in United States Trust.323
2. Due Process Doctrine Reflects a Principle Against
Governmental Self-Dealing
The Court’s bifurcated approach to the Contract Clause came
as a surprise to scholars and attracted a good deal of criticism.324
But, this surprise may have been unwarranted; long before United
States Trust, the Court expressed a similar concern about
governmental self-dealing in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause.325 In Perry v. United States,326 the petitioner
held bonds issued by the United States.327 Congress disavowed its
321. See Energy Res. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–
13 (1983) (noting that a stricter level of scrutiny applies under the Contract
Clause when a state alters its own contractual obligations).
322. See Evan C. Zoldan, The Permanent Seat of Government, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 205 (2011) [hereinafter Zoldan, Permanent Seat] (noting
arguments that neither the text nor history of the Constitution supports the
bifurcation of the Contract Clause).
323. Because the Contract Clause applies only to the states and not Congress,
it may be argued that mistrust of state legislatures prompted the Court’s
heightened scrutiny of state decisions to breach their own obligations. However,
as described below, the Court has imposed a parallel distinction against Congress
through the Due Process Clause. Infra Part III.C.2. This suggests that a concern
about self-dealing, rather than federalism, animates Contract Clause doctrine.
324. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 718–19 (1984) (arguing that the express language of the
Contract Clause does not distinguish between private and public contracts);
Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 267, 293–94 (1988) (arguing that United States Trust’s conclusion
is “precisely backwards”).
325. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 346 (1935) (discussing the
government’s ability to alter the terms of an agreement which later becomes
disadvantageous to it).
326. 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
327. See id. at 346 (describing the obligation owed by the United States).
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obligation to redeem the bonds in accordance with their terms.328
The Supreme Court rebuffed Congress, holding that the United
States is not “free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its
obligations in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment
inconvenient.”329 Importantly, the Court held that there is a
distinction between the power of the government to regulate
contractual obligations generally and the “power of the Congress
to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements.”330
Although Congress has a freer hand to regulate private contracts,
the Court specifically rejected the government’s argument that, as
a sovereign, Congress could not bind itself by contract.331 The
power to enter into binding contracts is itself a sovereign power,
the Court noted; it reasoned, therefore, that disclaiming a previous
contractual obligation was as much a repudiation of sovereignty as
fulfilling it.332
The Court has reaffirmed Perry’s essential point about
governmental self-dealing. In United States v. Winstar Corp.,333
the Court wrestled with the same question posed in Perry and,
indeed, United States Trust: that is, how does the law
accommodate the government’s prerogative to legislate with its
“obligation to honor its contracts.”334 The Winstar Court held that
the appropriate balance depends on whether the government’s
breach of contract is due to a sovereign act or whether the breach
is simply a repudiation by the “Government as contractor.”335 The
difficult question, the Court noted, is how to distinguish between
the government as contractor and the government as regulating
sovereign.336 The Court suggested a mechanism that, like its
Contract Clause analysis, resonates with a self-dealing rationale.
If a statute’s impact on the government’s financial obligations is
“merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 347.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 350–51 (emphasis added).
Id. at 350.
Id. at 353–54.
518 U.S. 839 (1996).
Id. at 896.
Id.
Id.
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governmental objective,” it will be considered a sovereign act.337
However, the “greater the Government’s self-interest . . . the more
suspect becomes the claim that its private contracting partners
ought to bear the financial burden.”338 Indeed, if “a substantial part
of the impact of the Government’s action rendering performance
impossible falls on its own contractual obligations,” the
government will not be able to claim any sovereign act defense at
all.339 Put simply, the Court suggested that the government’s
self-interest determines whether it must be bound by its
contractual obligations. When the government’s self-interest is
low, it has more leeway to take action with the effect of abrogating
its obligations. But, the government’s self-interest is presumed—
perhaps definitively established—when a “substantial part” of the
impact of the new rule benefits the government at the expense of
a party who bears the brunt of the change in law.340
3. Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine Reflects a Principle Against
Governmental Self-Dealing
The Contract Clause and Due Process Clause lines of cases
discussed above are similar because they reflect self-dealing in the
context of breaches of financial obligations. Indeed, it makes sense
that self-dealing concerns would come up most often in these cases.
Importantly, however, the Court’s concern with self-dealing
transcends the financial context. In the criminal context, too,
constitutional doctrine reflects an anti-self-dealing rationale. In
Carmell v. Texas,341 the Court considered whether a retrospective
change in an evidentiary rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.342
337. Id. at 898.
338. Id. (emphasis added).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
342. See id. at 516 (noting that not every retrospective change in rules of
evidence is unconstitutional); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390
(1798) (opining that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits, inter alia, “[e]very law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony,
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to
convict the offender” (emphasis added)).
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A state rule of evidence required convictions for certain sexual
offenses to be based both on testimony from the victim and
corroborating evidence.343 The rule was amended to permit
convictions for these offenses based solely on the victim’s
testimony, thereby lowering the amount of evidence needed to
convict.344 The application of the new law to conduct that occurred
before its enactment reduced the amount and kind of evidence
needed to convict a person;345 as a result, the Court held that the
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.346 But, the Court noted,
not every rule of evidence, if altered, implicates ex post facto
concerns.347 Rather, the evidentiary amendment at issue was
defective because it retroactively altered the rules “in a way that
is advantageous only to the State.”348 Some evidentiary rules, the
Court noted, are “evenhanded;” that is, “they may benefit either
the State or the defendant in any given case.”349 For example, a
change in a witness competency rule that retrospectively permits
a type of witness (like a convicted felon) to testify does not
“necessarily run in the State’s favor.”350 It may help the
government convict in some cases but, in others, it will aid the
defense.351 By contrast, rules that lower the amount of evidence
needed to convict have only one result: they “always run in the
prosecution’s favor because they always make it easier to convict
the accused.”352
Carmell reads a self-dealing rationale into the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The Court invalidated the retroactive application of a law
in a criminal case, but only because the change in law could benefit
343. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 516.
344. Id.
345. See id. at 531 (noting that the state law decreased the amount of evidence
needed to convict).
346. See id. at 531 (holding that the state law falls within Calder’s fourth
category of prohibited ex post facto laws).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 533.
349. Id. at 533 n.23.
350. Id. at 546.
351. See id. at 546–47 (distinguishing between even-handed changes in law
and changes that always inure to the benefit of the government).
352. Id. at 546.
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the government alone. Viewed in this light, the self-dealing
rationale appears to be doing the doctrinal work in Carmell; a
legislature has broad authority to alter the laws of evidence, even
retroactively, but only if the change could benefit a defendant as
well as the government. A rule that only benefits the government
is self-dealing and, therefore, prohibited as an ex post facto law.
D. Klein’s Principle Reformulated
The Contract, Due Process, and Ex Post Facto Clauses cover
different factual situations and reflect different goals.
Nevertheless, reading together the doctrine from these disparate
lines of cases reveals that they all reflect the tension between the
legislature’s right to achieve a public objective and its questionable
power to benefit itself at the expense of a member of the public.353
The Court reconciles this tension by emphasizing what may be
called a constitutional principle against governmental
self-dealing.354 When a statute has broadly applicable results, and
applies evenhandedly to the government and non-governmental
entities alike, it represents broad governmental policy rather than
self-dealing. By contrast, when a statute is drawn narrowly to
benefit the government in a particular set of cases, or necessarily
will run to the advantage of the government in all situations, a
statute self-deals within the meaning of this principle.355
353. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) (noting that
“some line has to be drawn . . . between regulatory legislation . . . and, on the
other hand, statutes tainted by a governmental objective of self-relief”); U.S. Tr.
Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (noting that “in reviewing
economic and social regulation . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment
as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure . . . . [H]owever,
complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is
not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”); Carmell v. Texas,
529 U.S. 513, 533 n.23 (2000) (stating that not “every rule that has an effect on
whether a defendant can be convicted implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause” even
though they might be unfair).
354. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–97 (evaluating statute reflecting
government self-interest); United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (same);
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23 (same).
355. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–97 (evaluating statute reflecting
government self-interest); United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (same);
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23 (same).
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A principle against governmental self-dealing has important
implications for understanding the proper functions of the
executive and judicial branches as well as the legislative branch.
Although the implications for the executive and judicial branches
are important, they are beyond the scope of this Article.356 The
remainder of this Article will address the implications of a
constitutional principle against governmental self-dealing only for
the purpose of reevaluating the Klein rule of decision principle.
Rule of decision doctrine and the self-dealing cases described
above, together with Klein itself, suggest a reformulated Klein rule
of decision principle that may be called the Klein Self-Dealing
Principle.357
356. For example, a constitutional principle against self-dealing may inform
the appropriate line between Article III judicial power and administrative agency
adjudicatory authority, see generally Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at
399, the scope of Emoluments Clause; Andy Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments
Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639 (2017), and judicial
disqualification, see generally Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A
Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 KAN. L. REV. 531 (2005).
357. An issue closely related to the Klein rule of decision question is the extent
to which Congress may interfere with final court judgments. The Court has held
that Congress may not subject a federal court judgment to revision by the
executive branch. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (holding
that “revision and control” of federal court judgments by the executive branch is
inconsistent with judicial independence). Nor may Congress require a court to
reopen a final judgment that is no longer subject to appeal. Compare Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S 211, 219 (1995) (holding that Congress may not
require federal courts to reopen final judgments), with United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (holding that a court must apply new
law to case pending on appeal). However, the court must modify an ongoing
injunction if required by a change in law. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32 (1855) (requiring court to
modify ongoing injunction to conform with new law). Miller v. French, 530 U.S.
327 (2000) blurred the line between ongoing injunctions and final judgments by
upholding a statute that revised final judgments, but only temporarily, and for
the purpose of facilitating other changes that were the main purpose of the law.
See id. at 346 (holding that an automatic stay does not suspend a final judgment);
GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 240 (describing Miller’s effect
on a principle preventing Congress from requiring the courts to reopen final
judgments). Miller stands in some tension with Klein to the extent that it allows
significant congressional intrusion into judicial activity; but, because it addresses
a somewhat different issue than Klein it does not stand in the way of an
enforceable rule of decision principle. However, to the extent that the final
judgment rule must be reconciled with the rule of decision principle, my tentative
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First, the general rule: a court must apply the law in force at
the time it decides a case,358 even to a case pending on appeal at
the time of the change,359 and even if applying the change benefits
the government.360
Second, the Klein principle is an exception to this general rule.
A court may not apply a statutory361 change in law that reflects
governmental self-dealing. A statute reflects governmental
self-dealing when it has the effect of benefitting the government as
a party in a case that is pending.362 A statute benefits the
view is that a principle against governmental self-dealing reconciles these two
lines of cases. A Klein self-dealing principle distinguishes between a statute that
affects the government’s obligations in a way that is “merely incidental to the
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective,” from a statute that
primarily affects an obligation of the government. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 897. The
statute at issue in Miller did affect a case to which the government was
(nominally) a party, but it also accomplished a broader governmental objective: it
set new standards for the entry of injunctions in prison litigation cases. As a
result, a Klein principle against self-dealing, if applied more broadly, also helps
clarify the Court’s final judgment doctrine. See also United States v. Sioux
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–05 (1980) (holding that Congress may reopen final
judgments in favor of the United States).
358. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431–32 (holding that the
bridge was no longer a nuisance, despite previous decision declaring it a nuisance,
because Congress intervened by passing a statute legalizing it).
359. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110 (“But if subsequent to the
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its
obligation denied.”).
360. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)
(upholding a statute conditionally ending litigation in favor of the United States).
361. Klein and other rule of decision cases involve the application of new
statutory requirements. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147
(1871) (considering effect of statutory change in law); Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441
(same). There are different principles at stake when a court considers the
retroactive application of a new judge-made rule or administrative regulation. See
generally Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (considering
retroactive application of judicial opinions); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204 (1988) (considering retroactive application of administrative
regulations). As a result, the Klein principle articulated in this Article applies
only to statutory changes in law.
362. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (holding that Congress may not
“prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself the
jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance
with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor”);
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government as a party if it has the effect of abrogating an
obligation owed by the government363 in a way that is not merely
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective.364 It is strong evidence that the change in law benefits
the government as a party rather than accomplishing a broader
governmental objective if the change necessarily will benefit the
government365 or if a substantial part of the impact of the change
in law is to relieve the government of its obligation.366
Third, there are two corollaries to the general rule and Klein
exception. Corollary A: if none or only an insubstantial part of the
impact of a change in law inures to the benefit of the government,
the court must apply the change in law.367 Corollary B: if the
change in law abrogates an obligation of the government only
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental

U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (“[C]omplete deference
to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S.
330, 350 (1935) (rejecting the argument that “Congress can disregard the
obligations of the Government at its discretion”); United States v. Winstar Corp.,
518 U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (holding that the Government’s self-interest in a
matter will affect the availability of the sovereign acts defense); Carmell v. Texas,
529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000) (invalidating a retrospective statute because it will
“necessarily run in the State’s favor”).
363. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (declining to defer to a state’s
repudiation of its own financial obligation); Perry, 294 U.S. at 350 (rejecting the
argument that “Congress can disregard the obligations of the Government at its
discretion”).
364. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (“[G]overnmental action will not be held
against the Government for purposes of the impossibility defense so long as the
action’s impact upon public contracts is . . . merely incidental to the
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective.”).
365. See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546 (stating that changes to the evidentiary
rules that lower the quantum of evidence needed to convict always benefit the
prosecution).
366. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (“[W]here a substantial part of the
impact of the Government’s action rendering performance impossible falls on its
own contractual obligations, the defense will be unavailable.”).
367. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 104–05
(1801) (applying a change in law for the benefit of parties other than the
government); United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–05 (1980) (same);
Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944) (same).
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objective, or benefits someone other than the government, then it
amends applicable law and must be applied by the court.368
The implications of this newly reformulated Klein rule of
decision principle, the Klein self-dealing principle, are explored in
Part IV, below.
IV. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle
If Klein is a puzzle, as it often has been described,369 this
Article has tried to fit its pieces together into an administrable
constitutional principle that fits within an established
constitutional tradition. As demonstrated above, the Court relies
on a self-dealing rationale throughout its constitutional law
doctrine, confirming that a principle against governmental
self-dealing is a value of constitutional weight.370 Reading Klein in
light of these cases allows us to view Klein not as an outlier or
“derelict on the waters of the law,”371 but rather as a specific
application of a deeply ingrained principle. This Part demonstrates
the explanatory power of the Klein self-dealing principle by
showing the extent to which it satisfies the constraints of both
Klein itself and other rule of decision cases. Part V demonstrates
how the Klein self-dealing principle provides a workable rule for
lower courts to follow by applying it to a series of hypothetical
cases.372
368. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1311 (2016) (applying a
change in law that sets broad government policy); Robertson v. Seattle Aububon
Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (same).
369. See Sager, supra note 11, at 2525 (noting that Klein “is deeply puzzling”);
see also Araiza, supra note 7119, at 1074 (“Klein is a puzzling case.”); Vermeule,
supra note 28, at 423 (“The puzzle is that if Klein’s pronouncements are taken
seriously, the decision can be made applicable to any statute at all.”); PFANDER,
supra note 96, at 405 (stating that the Klein decision has “puzzled” scholars since
it was decided).
370. See supra Part III.C (describing a principle against governmental selfdealing.
371. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 245 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
372. See infra Part V (applying principle against self-dealing to hypothetical
cases).
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A. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Explains Klein Itself
The principle against self-dealing formulated above explains
the result in Klein, which appears to be the only case of its kind to
have reached the Supreme Court. The Court of Claims correctly
awarded Klein damages against the United States under the
ACPA, as interpreted by Padelford, at the time the suit was
brought.373 However, by the time this judgment was subject to
review by the Supreme Court, Congress had changed the law
through the appropriations proviso. Under the general rule stated
above, the Court would have been bound to apply the proviso,
resulting in a dismissal of Klein’s claim on appeal, unless the Klein
self-dealing principle directed otherwise.374
Most of the elements of the Klein self-dealing principle are
satisfied by Klein without difficulty. The appropriations proviso
benefitted the government in pending cases, including both Klein’s
case and a number of other cases pending under the ACPA.375 It
benefitted the government by abrogating an obligation owed by the
government—the obligation to provide compensation for captured
property set out by the ACPA.376 The key interpretive question is
whether the proviso resulted in a benefit to the government as a
party or whether, by contrast, the benefit was merely incidental to
accomplishing a broader governmental objective.377 Under Klein’s
facts, the difficulty may be described in the following way: even
acknowledging that the proviso benefitted the government in
Klein’s pending case, was this benefit merely incidental to the
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective? On its face,
the purpose of the appropriations proviso was to deny
compensation to formerly disloyal southerners. Whether or not
this was a good result, can it not be described as a policy or, in the
373. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 533 (1869) (broadly
interpreting the ACPA to include claims like those in Klein).
374. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110 (applying change in law to
pending case).
375. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146 (noting that statute relieved the government of
its obligations in a pending case).
376. See id. at 138–39 (describing the government’s obligations under the
ACPA).
377. See supra Part III.D (describing the rule against governmental selfdealing).
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language of the Klein self-dealing principle, a “governmental
objective?”
Irrespective of Congress’s purposes in enacting the proviso,
the proviso did not establish a broader governmental policy within
the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle formulated above.
Under this principle, a change in law benefits the government as
a party in a way that is not incidental to a broader governmental
objective when the law necessarily will benefit the government378
or if a substantial part of the impact of the change is to relieve the
government of an obligation.379 As its application to Klein
demonstrates, the Klein self-dealing principle distinguishes
between an even-handed rule—one that sometimes benefits the
government and sometimes benefits other parties—from a rule
that always benefits the government. It also distinguishes between
a rule with a public objective—one in which the change of law
benefits the government but also does other things—from a rule
that relieves the government of an obligation but does nothing or
little else. Under Klein’s facts, the appropriations proviso was not
even-handed because it provided a rule that would always benefit
the government in all its applications.380 Indeed, the sole effect of
the proviso was to relieve the government of obligations
identifiable at the time the proviso was enacted.381 Moreover,
whatever the motivations of Congress for doing so, the effect of the
proviso was only to relieve the government of its obligations under
the ACPA, not to set public policy.382 As a result, under the Klein
self-dealing principle, the appropriations proviso benefitted the
government as a party in a pending case. It was, therefore,
self-dealing within the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle.
Because the appropriations proviso was self-dealing, the Court
correctly declined to apply it to the facts of Klein.
378. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000) (invalidating change in
law that necessarily benefitted the government in a pending case).
379. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (invalidating change in law that
relieved the government of its obligations in a pending case); United States v.
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (same); Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546
(same).
380. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (invalidating statute that would
necessarily benefit the government).
381. See id. at 148 (describing the effect of the proviso).
382. See id. (describing the effect of proviso).
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B. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Easily Explains Most Rule of
Decision Cases
A principle against governmental self-dealing is not, to be
sure, the only possible reading of Klein. But, unlike its many other
potential meanings,383 reading Klein to state a principle against
governmental self-dealing largely explains pre- and post-Klein
cases that consider the bounds of Congress’s power to direct
decisions in particular cases.
The broadest articulations of Klein suggest that it should be
read to prevent the government from picking winners and losers
in particular cases.384 This potential Klein principle, although
jurisprudentially attractive,385 has proved inconsistent with every
rule of decision case except Klein itself.386 By contrast, reading
Klein as limited to disfavoring governmental self-dealing explains
hard-to-distinguish cases that have made doctrinal analysis of
Klein so challenging. The Klein self-dealing principle is an
exception to the general rule that the court must apply a change in
law to pending cases, even cases pending on appeal.387 The Klein
self-dealing principle is an exception to this general rule, but only
for cases that demonstrate self-dealing on the part of the
government.388 In order for a statute to reflect self-dealing on the
part of the government, it must have the effect of benefitting the
government as a party in a case that is pending.389 As a result, a
383. See supra Part II (describing possible meanings of Klein).
384. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1336 (2016) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for permitting Congress to “unabashedly
pick the winners and losers in particular pending cases”).
385. See supra Part II.C (describing possible meanings of Klein; see also
Zoldan, Bank Markazi, supra note 144, at 8–9 (arguing that Bank Markazi
incorrectly rejected a value of legislative generality).
386. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
421, 435–36 (1855) (applying new law to benefit a party in a pending case); Bank
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1324–25 (same).
387. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801)
(applying a change in law to a pending case); Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
at 435–36 (same).
388. See supra Part III (describing a self-dealing justification for Klein).
389. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871)
(invalidating the statute that benefitted the government as a party in a pending
case); U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (same); United
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Klein self-dealing principle easily explains cases like Wheeling
Bridge and Bank Markazi, neither of which involved the
government as a party.390 Both of these opinions upheld statutes
in which the government picked a winner in a particular case;391
however, in neither case was the government a party to the
dispute. As a result, neither implicates the Klein self-dealing
principle. In the language of Corollary A, because the benefit of the
changes in law in these cases inured to a party other than the
government, the Court properly applied the change in law.
For this same reason, the Klein self-dealing principle also
explains cases in which the government is a party to an ongoing
dispute, but Congress’s intervening statute favors a party other
than the government. In Schooner Peggy, the American vessel
Trumbull captured the Schooner Peggy, which was brought to port
for condemnation.392 The court of appeals found that the Schooner
Peggy was an “armed vessel,” rendering the Peggy and its cargo
lawful prize.393 Accordingly, the court decreed that the proceeds of
the sale of the Peggy and its cargo should be divided between the
United States and the crew of the Trumbull.394 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a treaty entered into between the United
States and France, after the lower court’s opinion was rendered,
required the return of the vessel to France.395 Unlike Klein’s
appropriations proviso, the treaty had the effect of benefitting a
party to a pending case, but a party other than the government—
in this case the Peggy’s French owners. As a result, the Court
correctly applied the change in law under the Klein self-dealing
principle.
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (same); Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935) (same); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546
(2000) (same).
390. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 435–36 (applying a change in
law to benefit a party other than the government); Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at
1324–25 (same); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (same).
391. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1336 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that statute picked winner in pending case); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 228 (noting that
reducing favoritism is not the purpose of separation of powers).
392. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 108.
393. Id. at 106.
394. Id. at 107.
395. Id. at 108–109.
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Although Schooner Peggy did not expressly emphasize the
relevance of which party benefitted from the change in law, this
factor was central to the Court’s later opinions in Pope v. United
States396 and Sioux Nation, both of which emphasize the
significance of whether a change in law benefits the government
as litigating party.397 In Pope, a government contractor failed to
prevail in a claim for government funds in the Court of Claims.398
In response, Congress directed the Court of Claims to render
judgment in favor of the claimant.399 The Court distinguished this
case from Klein, noting that the special act, unlike Klein’s
appropriations proviso, created a new right enforceable against the
United States.400 Although the Court did not reach the question, it
doubted whether Klein prevented Congress from “set[ting] aside a
judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of the Government.”401
The question left open in Pope was answered a few decades
later in Sioux Nation. Sioux Nation arose out of a federal statute
that abrogated a treaty between the United States and the Sioux,
guaranteeing the latter undisturbed use of the Black Hills of South
Dakota.402 The Sioux claimed that the federal statute was a Fifth
Amendment taking but failed to prevail in their suit for
damages.403 Later, Congress created a general mechanism for
Indian tribes to bring claims against the government arising under
treaty.404 When the Sioux again brought a claim arising from the
loss of the Black Hills, this time pursuant to the new statute, the
court held that the claim was barred, because of res judicata, by
the previous Black Hills suit.405 In response, Congress enacted still
another statute, this time authorizing the court to hear the Sioux’s
396. 323 U.S. 1 (1944).
397. See id. at 8–9 (holding that Klein does not apply when Congress changes
the law to set aside judgment in favor of the government).
398. Id. at 5–6.
399. Id. at 6.
400. See id. at 9 (noting that the Act’s purpose was to create a new obligation
on the part of the Government).
401. Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added).
402. United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1980).
403. Id. at 384.
404. See id. at 384–85 (describing the Indian Claims Commission Act).
405. Id. at 387.
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Black Hills claim “without regard to the defense of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.”406 Freed from the restraints of preclusion, the
lower court awarded the Sioux compensation for the value of the
Black Hills.407 Reviewing this award, the Supreme Court
considered whether the statute reopening the Sioux’s claims for
judicial consideration had “passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power,” thereby violating Klein’s rule
of decision principle.408 The Court held that it did not.409 The Court
specifically distinguished Klein by emphasizing that Klein’s
appropriations proviso “required the courts to decide a controversy
in the Government’s favor.”410 This distinction is relevant, the
Court said, because it was of “obvious importance to the Klein
holding” that “Congress was attempting to decide the controversy
in its own favor.”411
Viewed through the lens of a Klein self-dealing principle,
Sioux Nation and Pope are easily explained. Unlike Klein, in which
the Court repudiated a change of law that benefited the
government as litigating party, Sioux Nation and Pope applied
changes in law that inured to the benefit of a party litigating
against the government.412 In the language of Corollary A, because
the change in law in these cases inured to the benefit of a party
other than the government, the court properly applied the change
in law.413

406. Id. at 391.
407. Id. at 389–90.
408. See id. at 391 (considering the application of Klein to a statute that
benefits someone other than the government (citing United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871))).
409. Id. at 404–05.
410. Id. at 404–05.
411. Id. at 405.
412. Id. at 405 (upholding statute that reopened claim against the
government); Pope, 323 U.S. at 8-9 (same).
413. See supra Part III.D (describing principle against governmental
self-dealing). Moreover, Sioux Nation and Pope affirm that Klein’s language
focusing on whether the change in law benefitted the government is not an
idiosyncrasy of the Klein opinion.
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C. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle and the Limits of Doctrine
The Klein self-dealing principle described above explains
Klein, situates it within a strong constitutional tradition
disfavoring self-dealing, and easily explains many of the rule of
decision cases that are thought to stand in tension with Klein. But,
other cases, even under the self-dealing principle, are difficult to
square with Klein. In particular, Robertson and Eslin each describe
factual situations that are similar to Klein in relevant ways.414 As
described below, the self-dealing principle goes a long way toward
explaining Robertson and Eslin, even if, ultimately, it is not
possible to reconcile them entirely with Klein.415 Nevertheless,
rereading Robertson and Eslin in light of the Klein self-dealing
principle elucidates two important implications of the principle.
Specifically, the Klein self-dealing principle gives new meaning to
the Changed Law Rule relied on by Robertson and the principle
invoked by Eslin that Congress pays claims only as a matter of
grace.
1. Robertson and the Changed Law Rule
The difficult Robertson decision has long been considered a
significant challenge to the articulation of a viable Klein principle.
By inverting the relationship between Klein’s rule of decision
principle and the Changed Law Rule, Robertson can be read to
mean that any statutory change prevents the application of Klein.
If it is true, as scholars and Chief Justice Roberts have argued,416
that Congress changes the law within the meaning of Klein
whenever it acts, then Robertson bars the application of Klein in
the only situations in which it might apply, to wit, when Congress
changes the law. But this is not the only way to read Robertson.
Viewing Robertson through the lens of self-dealing reveals a
principled standard for determining when an Act of Congress

414. See infra Parts IV.C.1–2 (describing Eslin and Robertson).
415. Id.
416. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (describing the narrow space between Robertson and Klein); see
also Araiza, supra note 7118, at 1079 (same).
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“changes applicable law” within the meaning of Klein that still
leaves some space for the operation of a Klein principle.
a. The Northwest Timber Compromise
Robertson arose out of the management of federally owned
forests in Oregon.417 The United States Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and the state of Oregon entered into an
agreement for the dual purposes of protecting spotted owls living
in the forests of Oregon and also permitting logging in those
forests.418 Conservation and logging groups brought suits to
challenge the designation of logging and protected areas.419 While
litigation was pending, Congress intervened; in a statute widely
known as the Northwest Timber Compromise, Congress required
the BLM to offer for sale a certain amount of timber during the
following year420 but also prohibited logging in particular areas.
Specifically, § (b)(3) prohibited harvesting in areas previously
designated as no-harvest areas by BLM.421 Section (b)(5)
prohibited harvesting in areas identified as no-harvest areas in the
agreement between BLM and the State of Oregon.422 Finally, as a
way to enforce the Compromise, Congress provided a conditional
mechanism for terminating the ongoing litigation over the proper
amount of timber harvesting.423 In § (b)(6), Congress provided that
“management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of
this section . . . is adequate consideration for the purpose of
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis” for three

417. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1992).
418. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D. Or. 1989).
419. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 432.
420. Id. at 433; see Department of the Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 101 Pub. L. No. 121, § 318(a), 103 Stat. 701, 745–50 (1990)
(providing for compromise between logging and preservation interests).
421. § 318(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 746.
422. See § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 746–47 (providing for compromise between
logging and preservation interests).
423. See § 318(b)(6), 103 Stat. at 747–48 (providing for conditional dismissal
of cases against the government).
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particular, pending cases challenging BLM’s logging and
preservation decisions.424
Put simply, if BLM sold timber and preserved forestland in
accordance with the provisions of §§ (b)(3) and (b)(5), it would be
deemed to have satisfied the statutory requirements that served
as the bases for suits pending against BLM. The effect of (b)(6),
therefore, was to require courts to dismiss the litigation
challenging BLM’s timber management decisions, provided that
BLM followed the conditions set out in the statute.425 The Court
upheld the Compromise against a Klein challenge.426 Finding that
the statute amended applicable law, the Court held that Klein’s
restrictions did not take hold.427
b. The Broader Governmental Objective Analysis
Robertson is often characterized as presenting an
insurmountable challenge to the continuing viability of an
enforceable Klein rule of decision principle.428 Indeed, by naming
particular cases, the Compromise appears to direct the outcome in
pending cases even more pointedly than Klein’s appropriations
proviso itself. Although Robertson is a close case, the Klein
self-dealing principle suggests how it might be distinguished from
Klein. Under this principle, the Compromise would be prohibited
as self-dealing only if it had the effect of abrogating an obligation
owed by the government in a way that was not merely incidental
to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective. It
would be strong evidence that the Compromise benefitted the
government as a party rather than accomplishing a broader
governmental objective if it necessarily benefitted the government
or if a substantial part of the impact of the Compromise was to
relieve the government of an obligation.429
424. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
425. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 434–36 (1992)
(describing the effect of the Compromise).
426. See id. at 441 (upholding the Compromise).
427. See id. (finding that the Compromise “did amend applicable law”).
428. See Vermeule, supra note 28, at 424 (describing tension between
Robertson and Klein); Araiza, supra note 7119, at 1079 (same).
429. Supra Part III.D; see also Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000)
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First, the Compromise did not necessarily benefit the
government. The key difference between the proviso and the
Compromise is the fact that the Compromise did not automatically
terminate the pending litigation against BLM; rather, it
conditioned the termination of the litigation on the BLM’s
satisfaction of the conditions in (b)(3) and (b)(5).430 As a result,
although the Compromise resulted in a benefit to the government
in the particular cases that were described in it, the benefit was
contingent. The Compromise did not provide a rule of decision that
necessarily inured to the benefit of the government,431 either in
those cases or in future cases. Section (b)(6) required the dismissal
of the suits it referenced only if the government abided by the
conditions in (b)(3) and (b)(5).432 Those conditions were not
foregone conclusions: the government was required by (b)(3) and
(b)(5) both to refrain from permitting logging in areas in which
BLM previously had prohibited it and to adhere to its agreement
with Oregon.433 In order to receive the benefit of the Compromise,
therefore, the government was required to modify its future
conduct. If the government had failed to meet either of these
conditions, the Compromise would not have determined the result
in the lawsuits referenced in the Compromise. Contrast this with
Klein. In Klein, the dismissal of cases under the proviso was not
conditioned on any future act of the government.434 Rather, there
was nothing that the government had to do—or refrain from
doing—to win every case within the ambit of the proviso. The
(upholding a change in law as evenhanded when it does not “necessarily run in
the State’s favor”).
430. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
101 Pub. L. No. 121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747 (1990) (describing
conditional termination of litigation).
431. Cf. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546 (invalidating statute that necessarily
benefitted the government in a pending case).
432. See § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747 (describing conditional termination
of litigation).
433. See § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 746–47 (describing conditions precedent to
termination of litigation); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 433–
35 (1992) (same).
434. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 129 (1871) (noting that
the proviso “deemed . . . conclusive evidence that such person did take part in and
give aid and comfort to the late rebellion” (citing Abandoned and Captured
Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820)).
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proviso’s benefit for the government was therefore a foregone
conclusion and the application of the proviso necessarily benefitted
the government.
Second, although it a close case, a substantial part of the
impact of the Compromise was not to relieve the government of an
obligation. This is the most analytically uncertain part of
Robertson. Certainly, some part of the impact of the Compromise
relieved the government of an obligation; at the least, it was
relieved of its obligation to litigate the cases referenced in the
Compromise.435 Further, to the extent that the obligations of (b)(3)
and (b)(5) were less onerous than the statutory obligations
provided by generally applicable environmental statutes, the
government was relieved of those burdens as well. But the
Compromise did considerably more than lighten the government’s
burdens. It was, truly, a compromise, balancing competing policies
of environmental conservation and natural resource exploitation.
As members of Congress described at the time, the Compromise
struck a balance between the preferences of environmentalists and
the timber community.436 In the Court’s words, it “established a
comprehensive set of rules to govern harvesting” in thirteen
national forests, albeit for a limited time.437 Seen in this light, the
government primarily stood to benefit from the Compromise in the
sense that it always benefits from successfully reaching agreement
among different interest groups over competing public goals.
Congress agreed to the Compromise precisely because interested
members of the public—including both environmentalists and the
logging industry—wanted to compromise.438
Moreover, because dismissal of the pending cases was
conditional, the Compromise forced the government to adhere to
the terms of the Compromise or risk returning to court to defend
435. See § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 746–47 (identifying cases to be
terminated).
436. See Associated Press, Compromise Reached on Spotted Owl, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/30/us/compromise-reached-onspotted-owl.html?mcubz=3 (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (describing the legislative
compromise to protect the spotted owl and allow logging in the Pacific Northwest)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
437. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 433.
438. See Associated Press, supra note 436 (describing policy issues at stake in
Compromise).
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its decision to depart from it.439 This is unlike Klein’s proviso.440
The proviso had the effect of voiding the government’s obligations
under the ACPA, forcing Klein and others like him to bear the costs
of the government’s decision.441 By contrast, rather than shifting
public costs to private parties, the Compromise forced the
government to continue to bear the costs associated with the deal
struck over timber and the spotted owl.442 Because of the widely
distributed benefits of the Compromise, relief of the government’s
obligation was not a substantial part of the Compromise within the
meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle. The implications of the
“substantial part” analysis are explored in the next section, which
applies the self-dealing principle to hypothetical future cases.443
c. The Changed Law Rule Reconsidered
The broader governmental objective analysis, which
distinguishes Robertson from Klein, also helps explain why the
Changed Law Rule can coexist with Klein. Robertson held that
Klein did not apply because the Compromise “amend[ed]
applicable law.”444 A broad rendering of the concept of amending
applicable law would swallow the Klein rule altogether, as Chief
Justice Roberts opined in Bank Markazi445 and as commentators
have argued.446 But, the broader governmental objective analysis
that distinguishes between Klein and Robertson suggests that not
439. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
101 Pub. L. No. 121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1990) (providing
mechanism for challenging the government’s implementation of the
Compromise).
440. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146 (describing proviso’s effect on government
obligations).
441. See id. (describing the proviso’s effect on government obligations).
442. See § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 749 (providing mechanism for challenging
the government’s implementation of the Compromise).
443. Infra Part III.D.
444. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
445. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (opining that a broad reading of the changed law rule swallows
the Klein principle).
446. See Araiza, supra note 72, at 1079 (suggesting that the space between
lawmaking and amending law may be non-existent).
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every statutory amendment “amends applicable law” within the
meaning of Klein. Rather, a change in law “amends applicable law”
only if it sets policy. In other words, as long as the benefit to the
government of a change in law is merely incidental to the
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective (as in
Robertson), a change in law amends applicable law within the
meaning of Klein. By contrast, if a substantial part of the effect of
the change is merely to relieve the government of an obligation (as
in Winstar or Klein), the change in law does not amend applicable
law and does not meet the requirements of the Changed Law Rule.
In the language of Corollary B, even though the Compromise
abrogated an obligation of the government, it also amended
applicable law because it accomplished a broader governmental
objective. Because the Compromise amended applicable law, it was
properly applied by the Court.
2. Eslin and Congress’s Grace
Eslin presents the greatest doctrinal challenge to the
formulation of a Klein principle consistent with rule of decision
cases.447 In Eslin, Congress enacted an appropriations bill that
repealed a previous grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to
hear suits making claims on government funds.448 The
appropriations bill vacated proceedings pending before the Court
of Claims, including a judgment for Eslin, which was pending on
appeal.449 Despite its striking similarity to Klein, the Court upheld
the appropriations bill,450 placing Eslin and Klein in significant
tension. The Klein self-dealing principle provides a framework that
brings into focus the difference between these cases, even if it is
ultimately impossible to reconcile them.451 Although it did benefit
the Treasury, Eslin’s appropriations proviso can be considered
something other than governmental self-dealing because the
447. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 585–86 (noting the tension between Eslin
and Klein); Eisenberg, supra note 180, at 526 (same).
448. See generally District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901).
449. Id. at 63–64.
450. Id. at 66.
451. See supra Part III.D (formulating a principle against governmental
self-dealing).
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obligation to pay Eslin’s claims was not an obligation of the United
States.452 Moreover, the fine distinction between Eslin and Klein
reveals an important insight about the key phrase in Klein
rejecting the argument that Congress’s payment of funds is always
a matter of grace.453 In order to understand the distinction between
Eslin and Klein, and to understand what it means for Congress to
have an obligation to allocate federal funds, it is necessary to know
a bit about the intertwined histories of the two main characters in
the Eslin case: the District of Columbia and the Court of Claims.
a. The District of Columbia
The District of Columbia is a federal district authorized by the
Constitution454 and created by a joint agreement among the United
States, Virginia, and Maryland.455 From its inception in 1790, the
District possessed a character distinct from the federal
government.456 At the time it was created, it was composed of five
distinct geographic areas with different municipal structures.457
After the District’s creation, the areas of the District that were
formerly part of Maryland continued to be governed by Maryland
law; so, too, were the portions of the District formerly part of
Virginia governed by Virginia law.458 These distinct municipal
areas were abolished in 1871, when the District was granted a
single government empowered, for the first time, to make its own
laws, appoint its own officers, and govern its own internal
affairs.459 The central organ of the new government was the
452. See infra Part IV.C.2.d (describing the distinction between government
obligations and acts of grace).
453. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144 (1871) (explaining
that it is “not entirely accurate” to say that the right to sue the government in the
Court of Claims is a “matter of favor”).
454. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the authority over federal
district).
455. Zoldan, Permanent Seat, supra note 322, at 173–77.
456. See WALTER FARLEIGH DODD, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 27 (1909) (describing that distinct municipal areas of the District
continued to be governed by state law).
457. Zoldan, Permanent Seat, supra note 322, at 173–77.
458. DODD, supra note 456, at 27.
459. Id. at 42; Gregory E. Mize, A Guide to Deciphering the Laws of a Unique
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powerful Board of Public Works (Board), a committee of five
appointees charged with overseeing the repair and maintenance of
the District’s streets, sewer system, and all other public works
projects.460
In what would become the undoing of the District’s
government, the Board was also permitted to enter into contracts
on behalf of the District for the completion of the projects it
oversaw.461 Almost immediately after its creation, the Board ran
over budget and was accused of financial mismanagement.462 A
series of congressional investigations followed, instigated by the
belief that the Board was wasteful and given over to cronyism.463
Whether the Board was corrupt is unclear;464 what is clear is that
the Board ran the District deep into debt.465 In three short years,
the Board bankrupted the District and precipitated its end as an
autonomous political entity.466 In 1874, after completing a third
investigation of the District in four years, Congress abolished the
District’s government, eliminating its legislative assembly,
governor, and, most relevantly, the Board.467

City-State Legislature—The Council of the District of Columbia, 2 POTOMAC L.
REV. 1, 7 (1979).
460. DODD, supra note 456, at 42–43; E.E. Naylor, The District of Columbia,
Its Legal Status, 21 GEO. L.J. 21, 26 (1932).
461. DODD, supra note 456, at 43; Naylor, supra note 460, at 26–27.
462. See DODD, supra note 456, at 45 (discussing allegations of the Board’s
“extravagance, violation of law, and corruption”).
463. See id. at 43–46 (describing allegations against Board); D.C. BD. OF
COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOR THE
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1896, at 49 (1896) [hereinafter 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS
REPORT] (noting that the Board promised rates above contract rates and awarded
no-bid contracts).
464. See DODD, supra note 456, at 50 (noting that the congressional
investigation did not confirm illegal activity); Naylor, supra note 460, at 28
(explaining that Board’s members were ultimately cleared of wrongdoing).
465. See DODD, supra note 456, at 46 (describing debt incurred by the Board);
Mize, supra note 459, at 7 (same).
466. See DODD, supra note 456, at 49 (describing bankruptcy of District’s
government).
467. See Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, § 1, 18 Stat. 116 (abolishing the
government of the District); DODD, supra note 456, at 49 (describing abolition of
the District’s government); Mize, supra note 459, at 7 (same).
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The claims at issue in Eslin arose from contracts made during
the Board’s short, unhappy existence. Eslin was the administrator
of the estate of Daniel Connolly, who had been contracted by the
Board to make improvements to the streets of Washington.468 The
claims that were the basis of Connolly’s suit were obligated
between 1871 and 1874 by the Board.469 When the District’s
government was abolished, its debts to contractors like Connolly
went unpaid.470 In response to the perception of the Board’s
profligacy and corruption, Congress—now solely in charge of the
District’s debts—made no provision for paying the District’s
outstanding contract debts.471
b. The Court of Claims
In 1863, Congress gave the Court of Claims the power to issue
final judgments472 against the United States for money
damages.473 But, at the time the District became bankrupt and its
government was abolished, the Court of Claims had no authority
to hear claims against the District.474 It was not for six years after
the abolition of the District’s government that Congress agreed to
assume its debts. In 1880, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims to include “jurisdiction of all claims now
existing against the District of Columbia arising out of contracts,
made by the late Board of Public Works.”475

468. Eslin v. District of Columbia, 22 Ct. Cl. 395, 399 (1887).
469. Id.
470. See DODD, supra note 456, at 50 (describing outstanding contracts of the
District after abolition of its government).
471. Id.
472. See Evan C. Zoldan, The King is Dead, Long Live the King!: Sovereign
Immunity and the Curious Case of Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities, 38
CONN. L. REV. 455, 493–95 (2006) (describing the origin of the authority of the
Court of Claims to render final judgments).
473. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 2, 12 Stat. 765 (establishing a court to
render final judgments on claims against the United States).
474. See id. (setting out jurisdiction of Court of Claims).
475. Act of June 16, 1880, ch. 243, § 1, 21 Stat. 284; see also In re District of
Columbia, 180 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1901) (describing jurisdiction over claims arising
out of Board obligations).
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c. Eslin in the Court of Claims
It was under this 1880 jurisdictional statute that the claims in
Eslin were brought before the Court of Claims.476 The claimant
sought the “Board Rate” rather than the “contract rate” for the
work that was completed on behalf of the District.477 The contract
rate was the rate specified by the actual written terms of
Connolly’s contracts with the Board.478 The Board Rate was an
amount later determined by the Board to be a fair amount for
particular types of work.479 The Court of Claims held that the
District was liable to Eslin for the lower contract rate rather than
the Board Rate.480
That would have been the end of Eslin’s claims but for an 1895
federal statute reviving them. At the urging of contractors
disappointed at receiving only the lower contract rates, Congress
amended the 1880 jurisdictional statute to require the Court of
Claims to grant new trials for all claims brought under the 1880
statute.481 In addition, the Court of Claims was required to award
judgment based on the higher Board Rate.482 As was recognized at
the time, the 1895 statute created a windfall for contractors, like
Connolly, who had already been paid for their work.483 Under the
1895 law, Eslin, whose claims had been paid at their contract rate,
again brought suit, this time for the Board Rate associated with

476. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 62–63 (1901) (describing
claims in Eslin).
477. 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49.
478. Eslin v. District of Columbia, 22 Ct. Cl. 395, 399 (1887).
479. Id. at 399–400; see also Franklin T. Howe, The Board of Public Works, 3
RECS. COLUM. HIST. SOC’Y 257, 264 (1900) (describing the Board Rate).
480. Eslin, 22 Ct. Cl. at 399–400.
481. 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49–50 (describing
the impetus behind the 1880 amendment).
482. See Act of Feb. 13, 1895, ch. 87, 28 Stat. 664 (amending the 1880 Act
providing for the settlement of outstanding claims); see also 1896 D.C.
COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49 (describing the impetus behind the
1880 amendment).
483. See 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49–50 (noting
that some contractors had persuaded the Board to award contracts based on the
representation that they could be performed at a rate lower than Board Rate, only
to bring suit for the higher rate after the 1895 Act).
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Connolly’s work.484 Pursuant to this new measure of damages,
Eslin received judgment for $13,000.485
The final scene in this drama took place in 1897. Regretting
the decision to reopen the claims against the District settled in
1880, Congress reclosed the reopened claims, providing that the
1895 act is “repealed, and all proceedings pending shall be vacated,
and no judgment heretofore rendered in pursuance of said act shall
be paid.”486 Because Eslin’s claims were among those reopened by
the 1895 act, the 1897 act had the effect of vacating the trial court’s
judgment for Eslin.487 On appeal, the Supreme Court considered
the effect of the 1897 act on the power of the Court to reexamine
the Court of Claims’s judgments. The Court upheld the 1897 act,
holding that it “was an act of grace upon the part of the United
States to provide for the payment by the Secretary of the Treasury
of the amount of any final judgment” in favor of Eslin.488 As a
result, the Court held, Congress’s decision to withdraw its grace
also must be given effect by the Court.489 The Court did just that,
ordering Eslin’s appeal dismissed and leaving him without
payment under the 1895 statute.490
d. Fulfilling an Obligation or an Act of Grace?
What light does this history shed on the viability of Klein?
Unlike Robertson’s Compromise, Eslin’s 1897 act appears to have
withdrawn jurisdiction over pending claims without any broader
governmental objective. As a result, if Eslin can be distinguished
from Klein, it is because the 1897 act did not abrogate an obligation
owed by the United States government within the meaning of the
Klein self-dealing principle. This conclusion is supported by the
484. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 63 (1901) (recounting the
procedural history of Eslin’s claims).
485. Id.
486. See Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 387, 29 Stat. 669; accord Eslin, 183 U.S. at
64 (describing the withdrawal of jurisdiction for claims reopened in 1895).
487. See Eslin, 183 U.S. at 64–65 (describing the effect of the 1897 withdrawal
of jurisdiction).
488. Id. at 65.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 65–66.
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legal differences between the District and the United States. When
the District became indebted for the work that was the subject of
Eslin’s claims, the District was, for relevant purposes, not the
United States government. It had a different source of lawmaking
authority than federal agencies or federal territories. Its law was
not federal law and its courts did not bind the federal government.
The District had its own budget, authority to contract, and court
system for resolving disputes against it.491 Although Congress had
provided a forum for claims against the United States, this forum,
the Court of Claims, could not be used for claims against the
District.492 Indeed, if Connolly had sued the District in 1874 in the
Court of Claims for breach of contract, the Court would have been
required to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. This
difference is reflected even in Eslin’s caption: unlike claims against
the United States for money damages, Eslin’s suit was one against
the District of Columbia.493
All of this suggests that the District was not, at the time it
became obligated to Connolly, the United States; and the District’s
obligations to Connolly, therefore, were not obligations of the
United States. Because the United States had no preexisting legal
or financial duty to assume the District’s debts, Congress’s 1880
decision to expand the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to include
the District’s debts conferred a gratuity on the District’s claimants
and did not create for itself an obligation. On this reading, the
Court correctly applied Eslin’s change in law because it inured to

491. See Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 62, § 40, 16 Stat. 428 (creating government
institutions for the District of Columbia).
492. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 2, 12 Stat. 284 765 (establishing a court
for the investigation of claims against the United States).
493. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 63 (1901) (noting that
Eslin’s claims were against the District of Columbia). If the Klein principle
against self-dealing as described above does not adequately address the difference
between these cases, I suggest that it is Eslin rather than Klein that should be
read narrowly to accommodate the difference between them. Klein aligns better
with the constitutional self-dealing cases, which restrict Congress’s power to
benefit itself by changing the law. A broad reading of Klein also comports better
with Sioux Nation, in which the Court made clear that it was of “obvious
importance to the Klein holding” that “Congress was attempting to decide the
controversy in its own favor.” United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405
(1980).
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the benefit of the District of Columbia rather than the United
States.
Reading Eslin in this way is not free of difficulty.494 Because
the 1895 jurisdictional statute reopened claims against the District
and provided a rule of decision for the Court of Claims to follow, it
could be said that the United States took on the obligation to pay
those claims in 1895, even though it had no obligation in 1874. This
is perhaps similar to Klein: Congress may not have had an
obligation to Wilson at the time it enacted the ACPA, but it surely
did after Padelford, in which its obligations to pardoned
southerners were clarified.495 There is an apparent incongruity in
characterizing the government’s obligations in Klein in formalist
terms (the government had the obligation to Klein after Padelford
whether or not it was correctly decided) while characterizing the
government’s obligation in Eslin in functionalist terms (Eslin’s
claim remained one against the District despite Congress’s formal
assumption of the debt in the 1895 act).
But, despite this challenge, understanding the 1895 expansion
of jurisdiction as a gratuitous act that created no obligation on the
part of the United States is the best way to make sense of the
results in Eslin and Klein. In both cases, the Court distinguished
between gratuitous acts and obligations. In Eslin, the Court held
that the 1895 statute, by which the United States agreed to pay
the higher Board Rate, was “an act of grace upon the part of the
United States.”496 As a result, Congress was later free to withhold
its grace and deny Eslin’s claims.497 By contrast, the Klein Court
rejected the very same argument. In Klein, the government argued
that the United States subjects itself to suit “ex gratia”—that is, as
a matter of grace—and therefore has the right to permit or deny
suit as it sees fit.498 The Court specifically rejected this argument,
holding that it is “as much the duty of the government as of
individuals to fulfill its obligations.”499
494. A special thanks to Evan Caminker for suggesting this point.
495. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 533 (1869) (broadly
interpreting the ACPA to include claims like those in Klein).
496. Eslin, 183 U.S. at 65.
497. Id. at 66.
498. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 135 (1871).
499. Id. at 144. The gratuity/obligation distinction made in Eslin and Klein
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Given the striking similarities between Eslin and Klein, the
difference between them seems to be only that the Court viewed
the ACPA in Klein as an obligation and the 1895 statute in Eslin
as a gratuity. And this gratuity/obligation distinction explains the
results in both cases if (and perhaps only if) the Eslin Court viewed
Congress’s assumption of the District’s debts as something other
than an obligation of the United States. The judgment rendered by
the Court of Claims in Klein was an obligation of the government
because of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ACPA in
Padelford, which required the United States to pay the class of
claims that included Klein’s claim.500 By contrast, when Congress
agreed to pay the debts of the District of Columbia, it did so not out
of legal obligation, but rather moral obligation. And this
undertaking did not create a legal obligation because it was ex
gratia, merely an “act of grace,” to take on the debts incurred by
another entity.501 As a result, Congress had no legal obligation to
pay these debts, even after it agreed to pay them in 1895. On this
reading, the Court upheld the Eslin appropriation proviso because
it did not abrogate an obligation owed by the government within
the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle. Eslin is, in other
words, less like Klein than it is like Schooner Peggy, in which
Congress conferred a benefit on a person other than the United
States itself.502 In the language of Corollary A, the change in law
inured to the benefit of the District rather than the government;
as a result, the Court correctly applied the change in law.503
Eslin raises a final point. Distinguishing between Klein and
Eslin based on the Court’s distinction between a gratuity and an

continues to exist in other areas of the law. See Burkhardt v. United States, 113
Ct. Cl. 658, 666 (1949) (identifying the distinction between payments made out of
legal and moral obligation); Granite State Ins. Co. v. ACE Am. Reinsurance Co.,
849 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (2007) (noting that an “ex gratia” payment is “one made by
a party that recognizes no legal obligation to pay”).
500. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 533 (1869) (broadly
interpreting the ACPA to include claims like those in Klein).
501. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 65 (1901).
502. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 104–05 (1801)
(upholding change in law that benefitted a party other than the government).
503. See id. (upholding change in law that benefitted a party other than the
government); United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–05 (same); Pope
v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944) (same).
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obligation suggests that the government can obligate itself in a
way that cannot lawfully be undone, but that not every
government promise is irrevocable. This is not novel; we have seen
the Court make this distinction already in Winstar, United States
Trust, and Carmell.504 But, the gratuity/obligation distinction
suggests an important unanswered question: under the Klein
self-dealing principle formulated above, what types of obligations
will the government be forced to honor? The possibility of broad
and narrow formulations of the Klein self-dealing principle are
discussed below, in which the principle is applied to hypothetical
future cases.
V. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Applied to Future Cases
The Klein self-dealing principle articulated above can help
lower courts approach future cases that implicate legislative
interference in the judicial process.505 The principle can resolve
some recurring problems easily. Consider the federal statute
enacted to resolve the debate over Terri Schiavo.506 While Schiavo
lay in a persistent vegetative state for a decade, her parents and
husband engaged in a protracted legal battle in state court over
whether she would have wished to be kept alive by artificial
means.507 After the court ordered the hospice facility in which she
resided to withhold food and water, Congress enacted Terri’s Law,
which permitted “any parent” of Terri Schiavo to bring suit in
federal district court to redress the decision to withhold her life
support.508 Through Terri’s Law, Congress set aside the previous
decade of state court litigation over Schiavo’s intentions,
504. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–97 (1996)
(invalidating statute reflecting government self-interest); U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (same); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533
n.23 (2000) (same).
505. See infra Part V (applying principle against self-dealing to future cases).
506. See Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16 (2005) (providing special exemption for named
individuals from generally applicable jurisdictional rules).
507. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
508. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16 (providing a special rule that
applied to two people only).
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permitting relitigation of previously adjudicated issues.509 Limited
to one event, and providing relief for two people only, Terri’s Law
provided a special exemption from generally applicable preclusion
rules that otherwise apply to suits in district court.510 Although
Terri’s Law interfered with the normal fact-finding process,
eliciting considerable scholarly criticism,511 it did not run afoul of
a Klein principle against self-dealing because it did not benefit the
government in a pending case.
Analysis of Terri’s Law reveals that a Klein self-dealing
principle is not an all-powerful tool to protect the judiciary from
the legislature; nor does it prevent Congress from picking winners
and losers in particular cases generally. It is possible, of course, to
imagine a stronger limitation on the legislative power—one that
would prevent Congress from singling out individuals for special
treatment. I have argued elsewhere that such a rule is supportable
and desirable.512 Nevertheless, such a rule would require a
wholesale abandonment of rule of decision doctrine and is,
therefore, outside the scope of this Article’s inquiry.
But, even though it stays largely, if not entirely, within the
constraints of doctrine, the Klein self-dealing principle articulated
above provides a meaningful check on legislative intrusion into the
judicial function. The following hypothetical cases reveal the power
and limitations of a Klein self-dealing principle. These
hypotheticals also answer the questions raised above about the
application of the “substantial part” standard and the kinds of
government promises that can be considered obligations.513 For
509. See id. (permitting a suit over previously litigated issues).
510. Id.
511. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 529 (arguing that if Terri’s Law does not
violate Klein by “impermissibly dictating to the federal courts a rule of decision,”
then Klein must be “virtually impossible to violate”).
512. There are historical, textual, and jurisprudential reasons to conclude
that the Constitution disfavors targeted legislation like Terri’s Law. See Zoldan,
Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 112, at 690 (suggesting that Terri’s
Law violates a principle of legislative generality). Moreover, stronger protection
against targeted legislation is attractive because of its association with
corruption, punishment without trial, and unjustified unequal treatment. See
Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 112, at 500–01, 510–18
(describing costs of special legislation).
513. See supra Parts IV.C.1–2 (noting unanswered questions about the scope
of a Klein principle against self-dealing).
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each case, consider the following excerpt from the hypothetical
federal statute, the “No Structures in Public Streams Act:”
“§ 1. No structure that impedes wildlife may be built in a
public stream.
§ 2. Any person may bring an action in federal district court
to enforce this Act.”
A. Case A—The Local Power Amendment
After the No Structures in Public Streams Act became law, the
United States Army Corps of Engineers, which is authorized by
statute to maintain navigable channels in the United States, built
a dam in the Huron River to generate power for the local
community. Fred Fisherman brought suit under the Act to require
the Army Corps to remove the dam. Fred demonstrated that the
Huron is a public stream and that the dam impeded salmon in the
river; accordingly, Fred prevailed before the district court. The
Corps appealed. While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted
the Local Power Amendment, which amended the Act by adding
the following language to section 1: “provided that, no structure
that is built for the purpose of generating power to serve the local
community impedes wildlife within the meaning of this Act.”
The Klein self-dealing principle would not prevent the Court
of Appeals from applying the Local Power Amendment. The
general rule provides that the court must apply the law to cases
pending on appeal at the time of the change.514 The Klein exception
would apply only if the Amendment reflects governmental
self-dealing, that is, if the Amendment has the effect of benefitting
the government as a party in the case that is pending.515 In order
to answer this question, the court would have to determine
whether the Amendment has the effect of abrogating an obligation
owed by the government in a way that is not merely incidental to
the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective.516 The
514. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 104–05
(1801) (applying a change in law in a pending case).
515. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–97 (1996)
(invalidating statute reflecting government self-interest); U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (same); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533
n.23 (same).
516. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (distinguishing between self-interested
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court would examine whether the Amendment necessarily benefits
the government and whether a substantial part of the impact of
the change in law is to relieve the government of its obligation.517
Assuming that the requirement to refrain from building
structures in public streams is an “obligation” within the meaning
of Klein (an assumption I will question below), applying the
Amendment will relieve the government of its obligation by
permitting the Army Corps’s dam. However, the abrogation of the
government’s obligation is incidental to the accomplishment of a
broader governmental objective within the meaning of the Klein
self-dealing principle. First, the Amendment will not necessarily
relieve the government of its obligation to refrain from building a
dam. To take advantage of the amendment, the government will
have to demonstrate that the purpose of the dam is to generate
power for the local community. In the absence of such a showing,
the government would not be relieved of its obligation. The
requirement that the government make a demonstration to take
advantage of the change in law preserves a small, but important
role for the judiciary in the adjudication process.518 Second, the
court would likely find that relieving the government of its
obligation is not a substantial part of the effect of the Amendment.
Because it applies to any number of locations, the Amendment
does far more than allow the government to build this particular
dam. And, because it applies to all structures built for power
generation, it does more than provide an exemption for the
government alone. As a result, the Amendment’s abrogation of the
government’s obligation is incidental to the accomplishment of a
broader governmental objective and it is not prohibited by the
Klein self-dealing principle.
Case A provides a relatively easy example of the difference
between a statute that amends applicable law and one that
laws and statutes “incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective”).
517. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871)
(invalidating change in law that relieved the government of its obligations in a
pending case); Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (same); Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546
(same).
518. Cf. Robertson v. Seattle Aububon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992)
(upholding the statute that conditionally resolved a pending case against the
government).
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provides a rule of decision in pending cases. As described above, a
viable Klein principle depends on the ability to meaningfully
distinguish between these concepts.519 A number of scholars, and
Chief Justice Roberts, have argued that there is no space between
them and, therefore, the Changed Law Rule swallows the Klein
rule of decision principle altogether.520 But, viewed in light of a
principle against self-dealing, the Changed Law Rule can be read
more narrowly to mean that a statute amends applicable law only
when it achieves a governmental objective other than simply
relieving the government of its obligations—in other words—when
it sets policy. By contrast, a change in law that does little more
than relieve the government of an obligation does not amend
applicable law within the meaning of Klein.
Is it possible to distinguish a statute that sets policy from one
that does not? At the margins, it surely is difficult to parse statutes
to determine whether they set policy. But the Klein self-dealing
principle, as applied to Case A, suggests some basic parameters for
making this distinction. A change in law like the Local Power
Amendment sets policy because it applies generally to an
indeterminate number of locations and an indeterminate class of
dam builders. In short, it appears to be setting a policy to
encourage power production. As a result, it changes applicable law
within the meaning of the Changed Law Rule. In the language of
Corollary B, because the Local Power Amendment does more than
relieve the government of an obligation, it amends applicable law
and must be applied by the court.521

519. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995) (reading
the Changed Law Rule as an exception to Klein); Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441
(implying that the Changed Law Rule is an exception to Klein); Bank Markazi v.
Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (2016) (relying on the Changed Law Rule).
520. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (opining
that changing the law is how Congress acts); Araiza, supra note 7, at 1079
(arguing that changing the law may be coextensive with prescribing a rule of
decision); Vermeule, Judicial Power, supra note 28, at 424 (arguing that efforts
to distinguish Klein from regular lawmaking have not succeeded).
521. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 (holding that Klein does not
prohibit Congress from amending applicable law); Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441
(stating that Klein’s “prohibition does not take hold when Congress ‘amend[s]
applicable law’”).
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B. Case B—The Federal Dam Power Amendment
Imagine again that Congress passed the No Structures in
Public Streams Act, the Corps built its dam, and Fred successfully
brought suit for its removal. This time, while the appeal was
pending, Congress enacted the Federal Dam Power Amendment,
which added the following language to section 1: “provided that, no
structure built by the federal government for the purpose of
generating power to serve the local community impedes wildlife
within the meaning of this Act.” As in Case A, the Klein
self-dealing question turns on whether the Amendment abrogated
an obligation of the government in a way that was merely
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective. And again, the court will consider whether the
Amendment necessarily benefits the government or if a
substantial part of the impact of the change in law is to relieve the
government of its obligation.
This is a much closer case under the Klein self-dealing
principle than Case A. Like Case A, and for the same reason, the
Federal Dam Power Amendment will not necessarily relieve the
government of its obligation. But, unlike Case A, the Amendment
abrogated the government’s—and only the government’s—
obligation. This example brings into sharp focus the difficulty of
determining, at the margins, whether a substantial part of the
impact of a statute is to relieve the government of an obligation.
On one hand, it is a perfectly cogent policy to suggest that the
government, but not private parties, should be permitted to
generate power. On the other hand, the concentration of the impact
on federal obligations suggests self-relief from Fred’s suit and suits
like it.
The Klein self-dealing principle does not provide an easy
answer to this difficult question. Whether a “substantial part” of
the impact of the statute is to relieve the government of an
obligation is necessarily a question of degree rather than
category.522 And the very fact that “substantial part” is a standard
rather than a categorical rule means that there will be close cases.
But the fact that the phrase “substantial part” is indefinite does
522. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–97 (1996)
(considering multiple factors as part of its substantial part analysis).
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not make it meaningless. Courts interpret and apply indefinite
standards, like the term “substantial part,” in many contexts,523
including when it makes self-dealing determinations.524
In Winstar, the Court held that the government was liable for
breaching an agreement over the regulatory treatment of debt
because Congress’s repudiation of the government’s agreement
was self-dealing.525 Although the statute had far reaching
consequences, the government was engaged in self-relief because
“a substantial part of the impact” of the government’s breach of
promise fell “on its own contractual obligations.”526 In making this
determination, the Court considered the number of government
agreements that would be nullified, the significant costs that
would be shifted to private parties, evidence that the purpose of
the statute was to violate contractual obligations, and the lack of
evidence of any purpose other than to relieve the government of an
obligation.527 A substantial part analysis, like the Court’s analysis
in Winstar, provides a framework for courts to decide even difficult
cases, like the case of the Federal Dam Power Amendment. As in
Winstar, the court could consider the extent of relief it provides to
the government from its previous obligations, the extent to which
private parties would bear the cost of the Amendment, and
evidence of the purpose of the statute.
Comparing cases A and B also helps resolve the vexing
problem of Klein’s relationship with particularized legislation. As
noted, the Court has often expressed concern with particularized
legislation. Indeed, in Hurtado, the Court stated unequivocally
that “a special rule for a particular person or a particular case”
cannot properly be considered “law.”528 Nevertheless, the modern
Court gives little weight to arguments based on specificity in the
Klein context, in part because of the difficulty in determining
523. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5545(c) (2012) (describing “substantial part” of time
spent); 49 U.S.C. § 5302(2) (describing “substantial part” of weekday time); id.
§ 106(p)(7)(C)(iii) (describing “substantial part” of activities); 34 U.S.C. § 10511
(describing “substantial part” of a program).
524. See Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 896–97 (describing analysis when statute
reflects government’s self-interest).
525. Id. at 843–45.
526. Id. at 899–900.
527. Id. at 891, 896, 923.
528. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535–36 (1884).
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whether a statute is impermissibly targeted.529 The Klein
self-dealing principle avoids this dilemma by assuming that
legislation that affects only private parties, even if particularized,
is implementing a broad governmental objective. Compare Case B
to Bank Markazi: in Bank Markazi, the statute at issue made the
assets of the Bank available to satisfy judgments against Iran.530
On one hand, the statute was special to one case, designated by
name, and to one defendant.531 On the other hand, the statute
resolved claims by hundreds of claimants. But then again, the
claimants were already known at the time the statute was
enacted.532 The difficulty in determining whether a large but closed
class was impermissibly targeted led the Court to downplay the
constitutional infirmity of targeted legislation.533 By focusing on
governmental self-dealing, however, the Klein self-dealing
principle eliminates the difficult line-drawing question for cases
between private parties. Only when the government is a party is
particularity an issue. Put another way, the Klein self-dealing
principle accommodates the decision in Bank Markazi, but
confines it to circumstances in which the government is not a
party. When the government is a party, consistent with Hurtado
and Winstar, legislative generality remains an important part of
the self-dealing analysis.
C. Case C—The Huron Dam Project Amendment
Finally, imagine again that Congress passed the No
Structures in Public Streams Act, the Corps built its dam, and
529. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–18, Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770) (including statements of Kagan, J., Roberts,
C.J., Alito, J., and Scalia, J., which evince the difficulty in determining whether
legislation can be impermissibly narrow); see also Zoldan, The Equal Protection
Component, supra note 112, at 496–97 (addressing, but not finally resolving, the
issue of particuarlity).
530. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (2016) (describing
the effect of a narrowly targeted law).
531. See id. at 1330 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the statute was
targeted to resolve a specific litigation).
532. Id.
533. See id. at 1317 (suggesting that targeted statutes are not constitutionally
problematic).
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Fred successfully brought suit for its removal. This time, while the
appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Huron Dam Project
Amendment, which added the following language to section 1:
“provided that, no structure that is described in the pending case
of Fisherman v. United States Army Corps of Engineers impedes
wildlife within the meaning of this Act.” Again, the self-dealing
test provides a framework for resolving the constitutionality of this
amendment.534 Applying the Klein self-dealing principle, the court
will ask whether the Amendment has the effect of abrogating an
obligation owed by the government in a way that is not merely
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental
objective. The court will examine whether the Amendment
necessarily benefits the government and whether a substantial
part of the impact of the change in law is to relieve the government
of its obligation.
Case C is most likely to violate a Klein self-dealing principle
of the three cases described. By exempting the Huron Dam Project
alone from the Act, the Amendment abrogates a government
obligation in a way that is not merely incidental to the
achievement of a broader governmental objective as defined by the
self-dealing test. Unlike Cases A and B, the Huron River Dam
Amendment necessarily benefits the government. There is no role
for the court other than to enter judgment for the government; the
court is cut completely out of the process of adjudicating the
dispute between the government and Fred. As a result, it is a
foregone conclusion that the government will win the pending case.
Moreover, a substantial part of the impact of the change in law is
to benefit the government. Unlike Case A, the Huron Dam
Amendment cannot be described as setting policy. The
Amendment does not encourage power generation generally; nor
does it even permit the government broad leeway to generate
power. Rather, the Amendment provides only a benefit to the
government in one particular, pending case. Because the
Amendment does not achieve a government objective other than to
benefit the government in a particular, pending case, it is likely
534. See supra Part III.D (formulating a principle against self-dealing). If this
level of specificity seems fanciful, recall that the statute upheld by the Court in
Bank Markazi also referred to a particular, pending case by name and docket
number.
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self-dealing within the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle
and therefore invalid.
Comparing Case C with Cases A and B reveals a few final
points about the Klein self-dealing principle. First, Case C brings
to the fore a question reserved earlier: what types of government
obligations will the government be forced to honor. In Klein, the
obligation that the government abrogated was an obligation to pay
money.535 The fact that only money was at stake makes Klein a
natural fit with the other self-dealing cases that implicate the
government’s financial obligations, like Winstar, Perry, and United
States Trust.536 On one hand, it makes sense to limit a Klein
self-dealing principle to financial obligations. When the
government’s choice is binary—to pay or not to pay a claim—a
court’s decision to require the government to pay is a limited
intrusion on a government decision. Indeed, Congress has already
undertaken to pay claims on the Treasury by waiving its sovereign
immunity through the Tucker Act.537 A court order to the
government to pay a claim that Congress has tried to nullify
through self-dealing is consistent with the general policy set out by
the Tucker Act to pay claims against the government.538 A Klein
self-dealing principle that considers the government bound only by
its financial obligations would be easy to apply without intruding
on policymaking. Although a Klein principle limited to financial
obligations is important, it would fail to prevent situations like
Case C.
On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of a Klein principle
that applies to non-financial obligations as well as financial
obligations. This broader reading is suggested by Carmell, which
prevented the government from undoing a non-financial
obligation.539 Although courts might be chary of invalidating
535. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 142 (1871).
536. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977)
(invalidating financially self-dealing statute); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518
U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (same); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935)
(same).
537. See Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (permitting claims against the
government for money damages).
538. See id. (permitting claims against the government for money damages).
539. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546–47 (2000) (invalidating selfdealing statute outside of financial context).
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statutes that breach non-financial obligations, the Klein
self-dealing principle articulated above would keep courts from
crossing the line into policymaking. The Klein self-dealing
principle prevents self-dealing only in pending cases, does not
prevent the government from abrogating its obligations if there is
a broader governmental objective, and provides a framework for
determining whether there is a broader governmental objective.540
As a result, courts can apply the Klein self-dealing principle in
non-financial, as well as financial, cases without fear that they will
intrude on government policy. By definition, so long as the
government is setting policy through its change in law, the court
will apply it. For example, even under the broader rendering of the
Klein self-dealing principle, Congress could easily authorize the
Army Corps to build a dam in the Huron River. For example, it
could repeal the No Structures in Public Streams Act altogether;
permit anyone to build a structure in the Huron River; or, as
described in Case A, permit anyone to build a dam anywhere for
power generation purposes. Although a viable Klein principle that
only applied to financial obligations would be worth preserving, its
application outside the context of financial obligations serves as an
additional important restraint on government action.
Second, as Case C suggests, it is not necessary to look to
Congress’s motives to find a Klein violation. Although self-dealing
may often elide with corruption, the two need not be joined.
Designating an act as self-dealing is not a moral statement about
the intention of the self-dealer, but rather a statement about the
status of the self-dealer; that is, a self-dealer is merely an entity in
the position to exercise a public power for private benefit. By
stripping self-dealing of its moral stigma, a court can apply a Klein
principle against self-dealing based solely on the impact of the
statute rather than the motivation of the body that enacted it. A
court would not have to impugn a legislature to find that a statute
violated Klein; nor would a court need to search legislative
materials to find evidence of a corrupt motivation to make the
Klein assessment.

540.

See supra Part III.D (formulating principle against self-dealing).
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VI. Conclusion
Defining the contours of Klein’s rule of decision principle has
vexed courts and scholars for generations. The puzzle of Klein
persists not only because it is doctrinally challenging, but because
it implicates the most basic, irresolvable questions about the line
separating Congress from the courts. Conceptualizing Klein as an
implementation of a principle against self-dealing reveals that it
can serve as a model for the relationship between the individual
and the government. A properly stated Klein principle
acknowledges Congress’s broad powers and recognizes the
impracticality of second-guessing Congress’s methods of achieving
legitimate goals. However, it also recognizes that a legislature of
the people does not merit deference in all cases. By helping to carve
the indistinct line demarcating the boundaries of legislative power,
Klein recognizes that securing justice from a government
comprised of people, comprised of us, with all of our weaknesses,
requires continuous vigilance. Seen in this light, Klein is an
embodiment of Madison’s ever-timely exhortation: “In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself.”541

541.
1987).

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,

